1 2 (2.00 pm) 3 MR JAY: This afternoon's witness is Mr Campbell, please. 4 MR ALASTAIR CAMPBELL (recalled) 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Campbell, you're still on oath 6 from your hearing of 13 November. I told you you'd be 7 back. Yes? 8 Questions by MR JAY 9 MR JAY: You provided us kindly with a second statement, 10 dated 30 April of this year. You confirm its contents 11 as true, do you? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. I'm going to deal with this by way of theme, if I may. 14 First of all, Mr Blair hiring you in 1994. We have one 15 version in your diary and another version, which is very 16 similar, in Mr Blair's book, "The Journey", page 75. He 17 considered you as part of a shortlist in discussion with 18 Mr Mandelson. Do you remember that? 19 A. No, I wasn't involved in that discussion. 20 Q. Right. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It was unlikely, given that they were 22 wondering whether you were the right person. 23 A. Yeah. 24 MR JAY: Mr Blair said he wanted a tabloid person and 25 thought Alastair Campbell would be the best. Did he 1 1 discuss that with you, in terms of the need for 2 a tabloid person? 3 A. No, what he said to me when I finally approached me was 4 that he wanted somebody that was strategic, that 5 understood the press and that would be able to do the 6 job that he wanted done. So I don't recall it being 7 particularly he wanted somebody who was from the 8 tabloids, but he wanted somebody that kind of knew that 9 world. 10 Q. By that stage, of course, you'd been political editor of 11 the Mirror for a number of years, hadn't you? 12 A. I had been, but at that time I was an editor on Today, 13 which was then owned by News. 14 Q. According to Mr Blair: 15 "I wanted a hard nut and thought he was good. What 16 I got was a genius." 17 A. Sweet. 18 Q. I'm not asking you to comment on, but the "hard nut" is 19 obviously an attribute which would be desirable in that 20 post, wouldn't it? 21 A. I think it's possible for somebody who's not necessarily 22 a hard nut to do part of that job, but I certainly think 23 that the way that the press and the media were 24 developing, you had to be pretty robust, and not shy of 25 engaging in difficult debate. 2 1 Q. In effect, you were headhunted. There were discussions 2 with Mr Blair in Provence in mid-August in 1994 which 3 you doubtless remember. According to Mr Blair, he 4 talked half the night alone with you and did the deal. 5 Mr Blair said: 6 "I gave what assurances I could on Peter." 7 Do you remember anything about that? 8 A. Yeah. He'd asked me to do the job. I said no a couple 9 of times, and then he asked me again and I went on 10 holiday and said I'd think about it, and he turned up on 11 holiday. One of the concerns I had was actually that 12 there would be two rival media operations going on and 13 I wanted assurances that that wasn't going to happen. 14 Q. Mr Blair says: 15 "He was already anxious about Gordon's people." 16 Is that the rival you're referring to? 17 A. No, when he talked about Peter, I meant that 18 whether Peter Mandelson would, in a sense, de facto want 19 to do the job that Tony Blair was asking me to do, and 20 as it happens, although Peter and I had our ups and 21 downs from time to time, by and large most of the time 22 we worked well today. 23 In relation to Gordon's people, yeah, there was 24 a sense that he had his own team, his own operation. 25 I am very much a team player, and I wanted to be clear 3 1 that I'd be able to -- on the communications side of 2 things, to lead that team. 3 Q. Two rather nice pen portraits of you and Mr Mandelson: 4 "Peter would slip into the castle through a secret 5 passageway and by nimble footwork and sharp and incisive 6 thrusts of the rapier, cleave his way to the throne 7 room." 8 A. Is this Tony's book? 9 Q. Yes. And you: 10 "Meanwhile, Alastair would be a very large oak 11 battering ram, destroying the castle gates, and neither 12 boiling pitch nor reinforced doors would keep him out." 13 A. Mm. 14 Q. That's not bad, is it? 15 A. Yeah, well. 16 Q. "He had great clanking balls as well." 17 A. Right. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let's move on. 19 MR JAY: Did you sign a confidentiality agreement when you 20 took this post in 1994 or subsequently in 1997? 21 A. I don't think I did. I signed -- I was covered 22 obviously from 1997 by the Official Secrets Act. 23 I can't remember if I signed a confidentiality agreement 24 in opposition. 25 Q. In 1997, after 1 May, you were entering Downing Street. 4 1 Can you remember whether you were vetted or not? 2 A. I was. 3 Q. Can you remember when you were, approximately? 4 A. I can't remember exactly when, but I can remember being 5 told early on that I would have to be. I mean, for 6 example, very early in Tony Blair's first term, we were 7 very big into the Northern Ireland situation. That was 8 obviously -- I was very much a part of that. So I can't 9 remember exactly when -- I remember being interviewed in 10 my office. I could probably find out a date for you. 11 It may be in one of those large number of books that you 12 have on your desk there, but I can remember being told 13 early on that I would have to go through what they 14 called the DV process. 15 Q. Yes. It might have been said that that was owing to the 16 circumstances in which you immediately found yourself, 17 namely close to documents relating to Northern 18 Ireland -- 19 A. No, I think it was -- no, I think it was just assumed 20 that I would have to be because of the -- I mean, in the 21 transition, there had been these discussions with Robin 22 Butler, who was at the time the cabinet secretary. 23 Jonathan Paul was going to be Chief of Staff, I was 24 going to be press secretary, and I think it was assumed 25 that we would be involved in all of the kind of 5 1 sensitive policy areas that Tony Blair was going to be 2 taking charge of. So, for example, we were very quickly 3 President of the European Union. There were lots of 4 NATO issues going on. So I think there was an 5 assumption from the word go that I would be. 6 Q. I think all I was trying on ascertain -- but it may be 7 very difficult to differentiate this -- was whether it 8 was a reason of principle which caused you to be vetted 9 or series of obvious circumstances which rendered it 10 desirable. I'm not sure it's possible to say which. 11 A. I think it was the former. I think it was the former. 12 I think it was made clear to Jonathan Powell and me that 13 we would have to go through that process. 14 Q. Okay. The next theme is the wooing of the Murdoch 15 press. Paragraph 9 of your statement, Mr Campbell, our 16 page 00795. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. In essence, you explain that it was a neutralisation 19 strategy but you ended up doing rather better than that. 20 That sums it up, doesn't it? 21 A. Yeah. 22 Q. And the reasons, from your perspective, are pretty 23 obvious: evisceration by the Murdoch press during the 24 Kinnock years; is that right? 25 A. Mm-hm. 6 1 Q. Anger over the 1992 election result, although, as you 2 say, cause and effect could never be clearly 3 established; is that right? 4 A. Yeah. 5 Q. And then the iconic status of the Sun. I mean, did you 6 feel in 1994 to 1997 that the Sun did occupy such 7 a status or not? 8 A. No, not really. I think that they'd very cleverly 9 marketed themselves as having such a status, and I think 10 that -- I say elsewhere in my statement about there was 11 a kind of sense of hierarchy and which papers were more 12 important than others, and I think the Sun -- I wouldn't 13 call it iconic, but I think it was a significant player, 14 and I think within the media marketplace, Rupert Murdoch 15 then had probably, within the press, a greater share and 16 greater power than perhaps he does now, because of all 17 the changes that have happened with television, 18 Internet, social media and so forth. 19 Q. Put another way, was it particularly important for you 20 either to neutralise the Sun or at best to win it over, 21 even if the word "iconic" may be putting it -- 22 A. That was certainly one of the things that I -- one of 23 the things we discussed in that night in France and it's 24 one of the objectives that I set myself, yeah. The 25 neutralisation strategy, in a sense, was you to counter 7 1 the influence that I had seen as a journalist who 2 supported the Labour Party, and to try to ensure that we 3 had a more level playing field where we could 4 communicate to the public what we were trying to do and 5 the changes we were trying to make. 6 Q. In terms of which paper was the biggest prize in terms 7 of either neutralisation or, at best, obtaining its 8 support, did the Sun fall into that category? 9 A. Well, it probably fell into the category of the only one 10 that might, as it were, shift position. I couldn't have 11 ever imagined the Daily Mail -- so our approach 12 vis-a-vis the Daily Mail, for example, was just to kind 13 of stop them being quite so vile. Our approach with 14 papers like the Express would have been to engage with 15 them, but I would never have expected the Express to 16 come out for the Labour Party. And the broadsheets were 17 in a slightly different space. The Mirror -- I'd worked 18 for the Mirror for years. I couldn't have imagined the 19 Mirror not supporting the Labour Party. So the Sun, in 20 a sense, was the only one that was in this rather odd 21 space. 22 But I was -- although we set ourselves that 23 objective, I don't -- I think if you'd had asked me in 24 1994 did I think the Sun would back us in 1997, I'd 25 probably have said no. 8 1 Q. Did you regard having to deal with Mr Murdoch and his 2 press as a necessary evil? 3 A. Well, I think it was part of the job. It was part of my 4 job to help Tony Blair communicate to the public and 5 part of that was through the media. Rupert Murdoch, 6 there's no point denying, is the single most important 7 media figure, and it would have been foolish on our part 8 not to have sought to build some sort of relationship 9 with him. 10 Q. Did you regard having to deal with him as a necessary 11 evil? 12 A. Well, I don't like the word "evil" in relation to 13 anyone, but I saw it as a part of my job and I saw it 14 a part of what we sought to do. I mean, I often -- as 15 again is clear from my diaries, there was often when 16 I didn't particularly like having to do it, and at times 17 nor did Tony Blair. I think there are various points in 18 my diary where I say that we -- including just before 19 the election -- I've written about this at some length 20 in my witness statement, where the Sun asked for a piece 21 about Europe and we talked about whether to do it and we 22 didn't in any way change policy but we knew what they 23 wanted rhetoric-wise and I did feel a little bit uneasy 24 at times, but there's no point pretending 25 Rupert Murdoch's not an important player in the media 9 1 landscape and we dealt with him, as has been well 2 documented by all of us. 3 Q. The diary entry of yours for 29 January 1997: 4 "TB was due to see Murdoch on Monday and said it 5 angered him that the meeting mattered, but it did." 6 So that suggests -- "necessary evil" may be putting 7 it too high, but still a degree of distaste. Would that 8 be closer to it? 9 A. Yeah. At times, yeah. 10 Q. And also the perception, rightly or wrongly, that the 11 meeting did matter because it was part and parcel of 12 winning over his support? That's also true, isn't it? 13 A. Yeah. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It might be better, rather than to 15 say a "necessary evil", to say a necessary obligation, 16 rather than something you went about because you wanted 17 to do it? 18 A. It wasn't an obligation. We didn't have to do it. 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. 20 A. We could have chosen -- the Labour Party for some years 21 after the Wapping dispute had nothing to do with the 22 Murdoch papers whatsoever. We made an active choice to 23 change that approach, and again, in the diaries, 24 Neil Kinnock, not happy about that at times. So we made 25 a choice, and the choice was that -- if you like, part 10 1 of what New Labour was trying to do was to show that 2 there was no part of public opinion that we were scared 3 of, there was no part of public opinion that we didn't 4 think we could take our message in, and in opposition, 5 getting your message through to the public, it's hard if 6 you don't have access to the press. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But isn't that a little bit why it 8 was actually, for you and the perception you had, an 9 obligation? 10 A. Um ... 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not saying by that that it was 12 something you couldn't not do -- 13 A. Okay, I infer from "obligation" a sense of duty. 14 I don't think we had a duty to do that. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I agree with you. 16 A. I think tactically, it would have been lacking good 17 sense not to have done it. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, it's the relationship and the 19 perception of the significance of the relationship that 20 actually runs through the whole thing, isn't it? 21 A. Yeah. 22 MR JAY: Given that Mr Murdoch was not quite in the same 23 place politically as New Labour, did not the very fact 24 of trying to obtain his support entail the making of 25 compromises by New Labour? 11 1 A. I don't think so, because I don't think, as it were, we 2 went out to him and said, "Rupert, we'd really like you 3 to back us", and I say in my statement far more 4 important -- and this isn't just about Murdoch. Because 5 Murdoch's the biggest figure and because the phone 6 hacking has led to this Inquiry, there's been a huge 7 amount of focus on him, but this goes right across the 8 media panoply. I mean, I was in charge of Tony Blair's 9 media operation and we had strategies for all of these 10 papers and we had approaches out to all of these papers. 11 But I certainly think that with Mr Murdoch -- I mean, 12 for example, you asked me in the questions in advance 13 about the visit to the Hayman Island. I was never in 14 doubt that was a good thing to do, because it gave us an 15 opportunity to, in a sense, use that event as a broader 16 public platform, and it gave us an opportunity to set 17 out for a huge number of editors and executives from 18 around the world what New Labour was about. I think it 19 would have been crazy not to do that. 20 Q. Did you have any previous dealings, as it were, with 21 Mr Murdoch when you worked for Today? That paper was 22 then in the Murdoch stable, wasn't it? 23 A. Yeah, and to be fair, I worked there under Richard 24 Stott, who had -- we'd worked together at the Mirror, 25 he'd been my editor there, and essentially we turned 12 1 Today from a broadly right-of-centre paper to a broadly 2 left-of-centre paper and I don't ever recall 3 Rupert Murdoch interfering on any level with what we 4 were trying to do there. Obviously he spoke to Richard 5 Stott from time to time, but -- and I would compare that 6 with, for example, when I worked with Robert Maxwell, 7 who did have a fairly interfering approach. 8 Q. When we move forward into 1995 and you begin to have 9 personal dealings with Mr Murdoch, you're doing that, 10 really, without much prior experience of him; is that 11 right? 12 A. Yeah. 13 Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement, 00795. You say, about 14 eight lines down, that you believe: 15 "... the Sun backed us because they knew we were 16 going to win. We did not win because they backed us." 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. Is part of the thinking there that Mr Murdoch likes to 19 back winners or not? 20 A. Yeah. Look, I think Rupert Murdoch has very, very -- he 21 has a very strong set of political beliefs. He's 22 fundamentally right wing on most issues. I think he's 23 somebody who is a news man and he's very, very 24 interested in stories, he's interested in powerful 25 people, but I think there is a sense that he likes to 13 1 back winners, and I think he thought -- you know, as 2 Gus O'Donnell said to you this morning, it was by then 3 fairly obvious that we were probably going to win the 4 election, but I do think sometimes that this point about 5 the perceived power that people talk of, of newspapers 6 that dictate elections, I just don't buy it. You know, 7 at the last election, David Cameron had the endorsement 8 of virtually all of the newspapers and didn't get 9 a majority. So I think we have to be careful about 10 this. Where I think they have an influence is in the 11 establishment of an overall agenda in which the 12 political environment and debate then plays out. 13 Q. Can I just ask you to comment on a paragraph in 14 Mr Powell's book, "New Machiavelli", which is page 190. 15 He's giving his perception of what was happening at this 16 time: 17 "Our primary target was Rupert Murdoch and Tony went 18 out of his way to woo him." 19 Are we agreed with that? 20 A. I don't like the word "woo", but he was certainly the 21 most important media player without a doubt. 22 Q. Then Mr Powell continues: 23 "I had been told by the Sunday Times correspondent 24 in Washington that the American economist and columnist 25 Irwin Stelzer was a confidante of Murdoch's and the best 14 1 way into him." 2 Do you agree with that? 3 A. No, I think the best way into Rupert Murdoch was via 4 Rupert Murdoch. 5 Q. Maybe Mr Powell is well putting it just a notch too 6 high, but if Mr Murdoch's not available, the best way to 7 Mr Murdoch, I think he's suggesting, is through 8 Mr Stelzer. Does that overstate it or not? 9 A. I think it probably does. I think that from where we 10 were in the UK -- Irwin Stelzer is very clever, very 11 close to Rupert Murdoch, but so were quite a few other 12 people that we dealt with almost on a daily basis. The 13 people editing newspapers here, Les Hinton and all sorts 14 of people. 15 Q. So one would certainly have to add to the list other 16 individuals; is that correct? 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. "Tony struck up a friendship with Irwin that lasted 19 throughout his time in government and he helped Tony win 20 over Murdoch." 21 Is that had true or not? 22 A. It may be. It may be -- I think it's true that Irwin 23 Stelzer became somebody that liked Tony Blair, liked 24 what New Labour was doing and probably was part of the 25 discussions that were going on within that particular 15 1 newspaper group. But I think we were always conscious 2 that in terms of any decision that there would be about 3 who they would back at the 1997 election that there 4 was -- that was a decision that would ultimately be made 5 by one man. 6 Q. Then Mr Powell talks about the trip to Hayman Island and 7 then continues: 8 "Tony put great efforts into maintaining the 9 relationship right throughout his time in government and 10 thereafter." 11 A. Yeah. 12 Q. The issue of any trade-offs, Mr Campbell. This is 13 paragraph 49 of your witness statement, page 00823. 14 A. Mm-hm. 15 Q. Can I deal with it bluntly in this way: are you able to 16 assist the Inquiry from your own knowledge with any 17 evidence which would suggest that an express deal was 18 made between Mr Murdoch and Mr Blair or Mr Blair's 19 government? 20 A. I don't think there ever was such a deal. 21 Q. Can we be clear, Mr Campbell, on what that answer is 22 based. I'm not asking to you comment; I'm just asking 23 you from your own knowledge. If you knew of such 24 a deal, you would tell us because I've asked you to tell 25 us. 16 1 A. Mm-hm. 2 Q. Do you have any evidence of such a deal or not? 3 A. No, absolutely not. 4 Q. In terms of the possibility of implied trade-offs for 5 unspoken reciprocations, paragraph 49, you refer there 6 to -- I think we probably asked you to look at the "big, 7 bad bastard" comment, which is Mr Paul Keating, who was 8 then the Labour prime minister in Australia, wasn't he? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. You cover this in your diaries, volume 1, pages 247 and 11 following. You set out part of the citation. Page 247. 12 We're on 16 July 1995: 13 "On Murdoch, he told TB: 'He's a big, bad bastard 14 and the only way you can deal with him is to make sure 15 he thinks you can be a big, bad bastard too. You can do 16 deals with him without ever saying a deal is done but 17 the only thing he cares about is his business and the 18 only language he respects is strength.'" 19 And then later on you say: 20 "If he thinks you're a winner, he would prefer to be 21 with you than against you." 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. Obviously, Mr Campbell, you weren't taking notes while 24 this conversation was going on, but you -- did you 25 record it that evening in your diary or how does it come 17 1 about that we see it in inverted commas? 2 A. I did actually quite often take notes in meetings, but 3 I can remember that -- I can't remember his exact words 4 in that conversation, but I can remember Paul Keating's 5 advice very clearly, and it was good advice. 6 I think later he said -- this is Keating again: 7 "You have to remember with Rupert that it's all 8 about Rupert. Rupert is number one, two, three and four 9 as far as Rupert is concerned. Anna and the kids come 10 next and everything else is a long, long way behind. 11 They overestimate the importance of their support for 12 you, but if you can get it, have it. If you're Labour, 13 you need all the help you can get to win elections." 14 And this is Paul Keating, who's had some 15 considerable experience of dealing with Rupert Murdoch. 16 Q. Yes. That's at page 249, the last paragraph of the 17 entry for that day. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. The reference to "they overestimate the importance of 20 their support for you", the "they" is a reference to the 21 Murdochs, is it? 22 A. Yeah. I think that relates to the point I made earlier. 23 I think newspapers do overstate their own importance and 24 I think politicians overstate it as well in terms of 25 endorsements at elections. 18 1 Q. Just Mr Keating's: 2 "You can do deals with him without ever saying 3 a deal is done." 4 Was he suggesting there: well, it's done on a nod 5 and a wink, or was he suggesting something else? 6 A. No, I think what he's saying there is actually explained 7 what he goes on to say, in that he's -- he needs to 8 know -- it's the "big, bad bastard" point. He needs to 9 know that you can be as tough as you need to be. And 10 I think that -- you see, again, I think in relation to 11 this whole area of policy, for me, there's been all this 12 focus on our media management techniques and so forth 13 and endless books written about it and so forth. 14 I don't think it's that important. What would be wrong 15 is if there ever were the kind of trade-off that you 16 were talking about and I don't think there's any 17 evidence of such a trade-off. 18 On the contrary, I think that if you were to talk to 19 people who worked at Sky, they would -- I think they 20 would argue that Rupert Murdoch's political profile and 21 the sort of general media neuralgia surrounding him 22 probably led to decisions being made with greater 23 scrutiny upon Sky that might have been other companies. 24 I mean, if you just look at the big policy decisions 25 we took, the biggest in the media sphere is probably the 19 1 rise of the BBC licence fee. They weren't terribly 2 happy about that. Ofcom, I think Mr Murdoch said in his 3 evidence, not terribly happy about that. He tried to 4 take over Manchester United and was blocked. The 5 digital switch, there were differences. ITV, 6 Channel 5 -- there were lots of areas where you'd be 7 hard-pressed to say that the Murdochs and the Murdoch 8 businesses were getting a good deal out of the Labour 9 government. 10 Q. Just to what Mr Keating was saying, wasn't he simply 11 saying this: that unless Mr Murdoch thinks that you too 12 are a big, bad bastard, there's no point even thinking 13 you can do a deal with him because he'll think that you 14 are weak, but the way he operates is by implied deals, 15 by nods and winks. Isn't it that the message Mr Keating 16 was trying to get across to you? 17 A. I don't think so. I think he was saying what he says in 18 that broader context that I have set out in the 19 statement, but I certainly think that Rupert Murdoch 20 would have been -- might have been thinking that 21 historically he'd had, for obvious reasons, this very, 22 very difficult relationship with the Labour Party, it 23 looked like there was going to be a Labour government, 24 historically, our policy positions would, in a sense, 25 have gone after the Murdoch empire, whether it's 20 1 cross-media ownership or whatever it might have been -- 2 my point is I never was witness to and don't believe 3 that there was ever a discussion that said, "Now, Tony, 4 if you do this and this and this, my papers will back 5 you." It just never happened. 6 I also think, as I've gone through some the issues, 7 that Tony Blair went through these -- and the government 8 went through these issues on their merits. 9 Q. Okay. May I come to the issue of any implied 10 trade-offs? Paragraph 13 of your statement. You deal 11 there with the Sun in 1997, but before I come to that, 12 do you agree with Mr Price's view, Mr Lance Price, that 13 plans to limit cross-media ownership in a way which 14 would have restricted Murdoch's empire had been quietly 15 dropped by the Labour Party within six months of Blair's 16 visit to Australia in 1995? 17 A. They hadn't been quietly dropped. We changed the 18 policy. We changed the position. 19 Q. Well, noisily dropped then? 20 A. I think that Lance was trying to feed into and play up 21 to the idea of some sort of conspiracy. There was none. 22 Tony Blair just wasn't terribly keen on the cross-media 23 ownership policy that we'd had up to then, and I've set 24 out in my statement what his general position was in 25 relation to cross-media ownership. 21 1 Q. So the attribution of cause and effect which Mr Price 2 sees in the sequence of events, you don't believe is 3 correct? 4 A. I don't, no. 5 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Blair about the 6 change in cross-media ownership policy? 7 A. I must have done. I must have done. 8 Q. Did he mention in any way the impact the change might 9 have or, more exactly, the existing policy would have 10 had, on the Murdoch press? 11 A. Not that I specifically recall, but it would certainly 12 have been a factor. It would have been a factor. 13 Q. So the change in policy was beneficial to the Murdoch 14 press and that was part of the thinking, was it? 15 A. No, what I mean by -- part of his thinking would be -- 16 I think Gus O'Donnell said to you today that in any 17 policy-making process, part of your thinking would be 18 about how this will be perceived, written up and so 19 forth. But Tony Blair's view on cross-media ownership 20 was that he was not in favour of changes in the position 21 of cross-media ownership that would lead to the closure 22 of titles. He was in favour of trying to broaden the 23 market and open up the market to new media owners. So 24 it was a principle policy position that just happened to 25 differ to the one that we'd held when Neil Kinnock 22 1 and -- I can't remember the position under John Smith, 2 but certainly when Neil Kinnock was leader of the Labour 3 Party. 4 Q. Okay. Can I deal with the Sun piece in 1997, which you 5 refer to in paragraph 13. 6 A. Yeah. 7 Q. I think we saw this with Mr Murdoch himself, the actual 8 piece, which Mr Blair wrote shortly before the 1997 9 election. It was in March 1997. About "our commitment 10 to a referendum on the Euro," you say: 11 "It was made clear to me by the editor that if 12 Mr Blair were to emphasise the point that there would be 13 no entry into the euro without a specific referendum on 14 the issue, that he understood people's fears about 15 a so-called European superstate, it was likely to be the 16 final piece of the jigsaw before Mr Murdoch agreed the 17 paper would back Labour." 18 You describe that as purely a question of rhetoric 19 but wasn't that specifically a matter of policy, or at 20 least something which Mr Blair did which he would not 21 otherwise have perhaps wanted to do? 22 A. No. In terms of -- the policy was already set. The 23 policy was set and we did have a discussion -- 24 I remember we did have a discussion about whether it was 25 sensible to do this piece at that time, and as I say -- 23 1 I go on to say that it was fantastically irritating on 2 one level that we had to go through these kind of 3 routines, but with an election looming, we would be daft 4 not to try it. 5 So I don't think we did change policy. I will admit 6 to being a little bit queasy about the -- I think the 7 headline was "Why I love the pound", and it was -- so 8 I was a little bit queasy about that. I will be honest 9 about that. But I don't think on policy anything was 10 ever traded with Rupert Murdoch or indeed with any other 11 media owner. 12 So there's an example of where the Sun, mass-selling 13 newspaper, coming up to an election campaign, is giving 14 us half a page to set out our stall on an issue which is 15 important -- probably more important to the paper than 16 it is to their readers, to be absolutely frank -- and we 17 took that opportunity. As I say, we would have been 18 crazy not to. 19 Q. You'll have to remind me: was it part of the Labour 20 Party manifesto in 1997 that there would be a referendum 21 before the United Kingdom entered the euro? 22 A. Yeah. I think I'm right in saying it was one of the 23 five pledges. 24 Q. I'm not saying this is ancient history because it isn't, 25 it is 15 years ago and we're trying to remember. The 24 1 article in the Sun, which I think was in mid-March 1997, 2 that obviously postdated the Labour Party manifesto, did 3 it? 4 A. I can't remember where -- by this time, everybody knew 5 that we were committed to a referendum. I'm pretty sure 6 of that. 7 Q. So even if the manifesto had not been published, it 8 would have been written six weeks or so before the 9 General Election, because we know the election was 1 May 10 1997. 11 A. I mean, I'd have to go back and check exactly what's in 12 the manifesto and when that -- the manifesto would have 13 been published after this, certainly, because the 14 campaign hadn't been announced, but I don't think we 15 were announcing anything new in this piece at all. 16 Q. Okay. So you would characterise what happened as 17 perhaps slightly irritating, if not causing a degree of 18 discomfort, but amounting to no more than rhetoric 19 because it didn't amount to a policy change? 20 A. Yeah. 21 Q. Have I correctly summarised? Okay. Can I ask you -- 22 A. But also, can I just say there that there may well have 23 been positions, situations with -- either in relation to 24 the Sun or other newspapers, where the Prime Minister 25 would give interviews, articles, speeches and so forth, 25 1 where he might set out policy changes, and part of any 2 policy change, you're trying to get it communicated 3 through the press. I'm making the point about this one, 4 that this is an area where I would say we were meeting 5 them with rhetoric, and it didn't -- therefore there was 6 no sense of any trade-off, implied or unimplied. 7 Q. The Mediaset issue we covered with Mr Murdoch. It's 8 clear that Mr Prodi made the call at the end of the day. 9 Can I just ask you about one entry in your diary. 10 Volume 2, 1 April 1998, page 338. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. "TB said he didn't fear them coming at him about me but 13 about the relationship with Murdoch ..." 14 Pausing there, the political knives were out for you 15 at that time as well, weren't they? 16 A. They were. 17 Q. I'm not sure this Inquiry need go into that. We're more 18 concerned with the underlying point. Then you say: 19 "... and he [that's Mr Blair] didn't fancy 20 a sustained set of questions about whether Murdoch 21 lobbied him." 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. So that's a paraphrase of obviously a conversation you 24 had with Mr Blair, is it? 25 A. Yeah. 26 1 Q. Why didn't he fancy such a sustained set of questions? 2 A. Because the -- I think I've quoted in my statement 3 the -- what I said at the briefing on this, that the -- 4 I said in a Number 10 briefing: 5 "The conversation with Prodi had covered a range of 6 issues. It had been agreed that neither side would 7 brief on it. This had been honoured. The FT should not 8 use an anonymous Italian official to stand up a story 9 that was wrong. Of course, if asked, we would always 10 say that the PM spoke up for British firms. It would be 11 a bit odd if, as the PM of Great Britain, he did not. 12 This did not, however, stand up the story and talk of 13 intervention presented in this way was simply wrong." 14 Now, it did lead to a considerable frenzy, this one, 15 and we possibly could have handled it differently. The 16 call from Prodi was not about this. It was about 17 something completely different, and Prodi had asked for 18 us not to brief on it. 19 The FT then run this story and I refused to accept 20 that this was intervention as they were presenting it. 21 I think what Tony Blair is saying is that he was worried 22 actually that that was -- standing up in the House of 23 Commons to a sustained set of questions about why is 24 this not an intervention, I think he found that 25 difficult. 27 1 I've said in my statement: 2 "I was less concerned because I felt my statement 3 that it would be odd if the British Prime Minister did 4 not stand up for British companies reflected that 5 likelihood. Indeed, in the briefing of March 24 1998, 6 journalists pointed out that my statement did not amount 7 to a full denial, to which I responded I was not adding 8 to the statement." 9 And it's true. It was not a full denial. 10 Q. Maybe Mr Blair's concern was based on how all this 11 appeared? 12 A. By then it was a full-blown 24 caret frenzy. It's one 13 of those that's tricky. Rupert Murdoch had mentioned 14 this company to the Prime Minister and the 15 Prime Minister, as I recall -- we did have a discussion 16 about whether there was anything wrong in him raising 17 it. In the end, he didn't raise it until this phone 18 call came along on something else and he mentioned it 19 and Prodi said words to the effect that Murdoch's 20 wasting his time and I don't think it went any further. 21 Q. The origin of all of this kerfuffle was an express 22 request by Mr Murdoch, presumably made by phone to the 23 Prime Minister, to intervene in a certain way? 24 A. No, I don't think -- I think he was trying to establish 25 whether, words to the effect, he was wasting his time 28 1 trying to get into the Italian marketplace. 2 Q. Even if it wasn't to intervene in a way which would 3 necessarily produce direct results, at least to 4 ascertain how the Italian marketplace looked, should he 5 put his toe in the water; that's what it amounted to, 6 wasn't it? 7 A. Well, I wasn't privy to the call that he had and nor, 8 until this story blew up, was I privy to the call with 9 Mr Prodi, but I stood on that line for over several 10 pretty lengthy briefings that I refuse to accept that 11 was an intervention in the way that it was being 12 presented by the Financial Times. That's where the 13 difficulty came in because the press said it was an 14 intervention and I can see why, but you know, sometimes 15 in these situations, you hold a line and that's what we 16 did. And in the end, nothing came of it. 17 Q. It would have been an intervention if Mr Murdoch was 18 seeking an express regulatory favour, which clearly he 19 wasn't, but he was seeking information from the 20 Italians, wasn't he? 21 A. I think -- I mean, I know you're going to be seeing 22 Mr Blair and you'll be able to ask him, because he had 23 the conversation. My sense of it would be that he's 24 simply saying, "I'm interested in this Italian company. 25 Do you think I'm wasting my time?" And I don't think 29 1 there was anything more than that. 2 Q. Okay. Of course, the reference to helping a British 3 company was not quite accurate, since we're talking 4 about one of Mr Murdoch's -- well, he'd either set up 5 his own Italian company for the intervention, or we're 6 looking back at News Corp, which is incorporated in the 7 United States. 8 A. I accept that but I think more accurate -- this is not 9 a transcript; it's an account of the briefing and we're 10 talking about companies with British interests. 11 Q. The other area we need to look at -- and you cover it at 12 paragraph 15 of your statement -- is media policy 13 generally. You do say in the third sentence of 14 paragraph 15: 15 "Ironically, the only area where I believe we may 16 have fallen foul of this relates to the area of the 17 press itself." 18 And then you refer to the current government. Are 19 you suggesting that through fear of a hostile reaction, 20 possibly even ad hominem attacks, the Labour government 21 between 1997 and 2010 was shy of taking on the press and 22 bringing in necessary press reform in terms of 23 regulation? Is that the thesis which you say might have 24 some validity? 25 A. Well, I wouldn't date it as far back as 1997, but 30 1 I think as time wore on, I think a view developed 2 generally in government, certainly with the 3 Prime Minister and other senior mayors, that there was 4 a real problem and I think that if -- I certainly, as 5 I say in my statement, was advancing the case: if you 6 think there's a real problem, then we should do 7 something about it, and part of the thinking as to why 8 not to do something about it -- I think there were two 9 main reasons. One was the one that the Prime Minister 10 has talked about this before, that actually the public 11 just wouldn't understand, because one of the lines being 12 run at us by the press was that we had them all in our 13 pocket. Not true, but that's one of the kind of lines 14 that was run against us. The public are going to be 15 confused as to why we're suddenly saying this is 16 a problem. 17 The second thing is that the public had elected us 18 to do all sorts of things. Press regulation was not one 19 of them. 20 So that was, as it were, the points of principle. 21 I think there was a political point of pragmatism, that 22 Tony Blair would have taken the view that it was not 23 politically sensible, and, you know, it's no secret that 24 this was one of the few things that we argued about. We 25 argued about it over several years. 31 1 Q. We can quite see, Mr Campbell, if we go back to 1997, 2 which of course was before the death of Princess Diana, 3 that to have included anything in the Labour Party 4 manifesto which would have committed that government to 5 press regulatory reform might have about been a bit 6 ambitious. Others may comment on that. But by the time 7 we get to 2001, and in particular 2005, there was 8 a possibility, wasn't there, to include it within the 9 government's legislative programme; is that correct? 10 A. Well, there was always the possibility. As to whether 11 there was any likelihood, I suspect there wasn't. But 12 some of us were arguing that there should have been. 13 Q. When you refer to concerns about what the media culture 14 was -- that's the second sentence of paragraph 16 -- 15 A. Yeah. 16 Q. -- can we be clear what the analysis is, because it may 17 be said to fall in two parts. There's one, the 18 political analysis, which is the culture of negativity, 19 the fusion of news and comment, the press driving the 20 news agenda, all the matters which I know are of deep 21 interest and concern to you, but can we put them sort of 22 on one side. Then there are the wider concerns about 23 the culture, practice and ethics of the press: 24 harassment, intrusion, breach of privacy. I know the 25 two concerns overlap to some extent, but they're more 32 1 concerned with the interests of individuals. 2 Was your analysis, which is what you refer to on the 3 third line -- did it embrace both those concerns or only 4 one of those concerns? 5 A. Both of them, and I think actually in my first witness 6 statement, I set it out when I talk about a summary of 7 the debit side: 8 "News values and whether something is true counts 9 for less than whether it makes a good story. Cultural 10 negativity, in which the prominence and weight given to 11 coverage is not proportionate to the significance or 12 newsworthiness of the matter being reported but whether 13 it fits the agenda of the outlet. Lack of anything 14 approaching the sort of transparency or accountability 15 people expect from an organisation. Ineffectual 16 regulation and a culture dominated by the media 17 themselves which allows inaccuracies, distortion, 18 unfairness, invasion of privacy and dubious practices to 19 continue with impunity and a culture in which any 20 attempt to check or question the role of media is met 21 with denunciations of the motives of those concerns and 22 instant claims that freedom of speech is under threat." 23 They sum up what I mean by "the culture". I suppose 24 I would throw in there the culture of celebrity. 25 Q. Yes, it's fair that your first statement covers those 33 1 matters. 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. And you're not identifying, are you, a particular 4 section of the press, or are you? 5 A. No, I think the culture. I think it's where the centre 6 of gravity within the culture has moved to. So I think 7 it covers the broadcasters, I think it covers the 8 broadsheets and the tabloids as well but just to 9 different varying degrees. 10 Q. We know it's Mr Mandelson's view -- and we've provided 11 for you the piece in the Guardian, which he wrote 12 in July of last year. It's under tab 7. He said: 13 "The truth is no issue of priority or principle was 14 involved. We simply chose to be cowed because we were 15 too fearful to do otherwise." 16 Then he says: 17 "... and David Cameron took up where Tony Blair and 18 Gordon left off." 19 Ignoring what happened after May 2010, do you agree 20 with Lord Mandelson's view? "We simply chose to be 21 cowed"? 22 A. I agree with it to some extent. I mean, he said there 23 was no issue of principle or priority. I think there 24 were issues of principle and priority, which I referred 25 to a moment ago, but I do accept that part of the 34 1 thinking of the Prime Minister and some of his 2 colleagues was that to take on the whole of the press at 3 the time when most of the public thought we got a pretty 4 good deal was politically not very sensible. 5 Q. It might have been difficult to have approached this on 6 a cross-party basis at any time between 1997 and 7 certainly 2010, unless you were to identify a short 8 window of opportunity which opened after the tragic 9 death of Princess Diana; is that right? 10 A. I think it would have been impossible to get 11 a cross-party agreement on something like this. 12 Q. What about that short window of opportunity? 13 A. I'm not sure there really was one. I think that the -- 14 interestingly -- I saw you had Chris Mullin's diaries as 15 well. He was of the view that the short window of 16 opportunity was the same day we did Bank of England 17 independence, ie. straight after the election, but 18 I think that would have been very, very difficult for 19 obvious reasons. 20 I don't think there was -- even with all the focus 21 there was upon the conduct of the media post Diana's 22 death, I don't think there was that kind of political or 23 public appetite. This debate is only happening because 24 of this Inquiry and this Inquiry's only happening 25 because of the specific set of issues that led to it, 35 1 but these cultural issues have been underlying it for 2 some time. As I said in my first statement, both the 3 media and politics have not really faced up to that. 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you detect an appetite now to do 5 that? 6 A. No, if I'm being frank. I thought that Michael Gove's 7 speech to the parliamentary press gallery was part of 8 the political strategy. I don't think that 9 David Cameron particularly wants to have to deal with 10 this. I don't think he wanted to set up the Inquiry. 11 He had to do it in the end. I think it would be very 12 difficult for him not to go along with whatever 13 recommendations or at least a very large part of the 14 recommendations the Inquiry produces, but I don't think 15 there is much of an appetite. I hope there is some 16 appetite for the sort of cross-party approach you were 17 talking about with Gus O'Donnell earlier, but I wouldn't 18 rule out the possibility of the politicians looking to 19 see how this might affect their positioning vis a vis 20 the next election. 21 So I think there is some appetite for change, but 22 I wouldn't overstate it. I think there's quite a big 23 appetite for the people who are no longer there. 24 Q. The general topic of reform of the press, in particular 25 regulation, Mr Powell again, page 206. See whether this 36 1 accords with your recollection: 2 "We first started discussing how we could remedy the 3 failed relationship between the media and politics in 4 2002. We even considered putting the PCC on a statutory 5 basis and creating a right of reply that exists in other 6 countries." 7 Do you recall that? 8 A. I do. 9 Q. Is he, broadly speaking, correct about the discussions 10 you were having internally? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And then he says: 13 "In 2003, I [that's obviously Mr Powell] 14 commissioned Ed Richards in the policy unit to start 15 working on a Royal Commission, limits on ownership and 16 a privacy law." 17 Do you recall that? 18 A. I do. 19 Q. "We discussed the issue back and forth for the next 20 three years but Tony never felt the moment was right to 21 speak out, in part because the press would always have 22 the last word, as it was they who would report and 23 interpret what he said." 24 Does that correctly summarise it? 25 A. Yes. 37 1 Q. "In 2006, he [Mr Blair now] told me that he would 2 consider putting surprise legislation in the Queen's 3 speech on the subject, but he didn't." 4 A. Mm-hm. 5 Q. When he finally did make a speech on the media in 6 2007 -- that's the famous "feral beast" speech of June 7 2007, which perhaps didn't receive the attention it 8 deserved -- Mr Powell says it was too late. Is that 9 a fair sort of conspectus of what was happening? 10 A. Yeah. I think also, as I said in my witness statement, 11 political leaders, even when they're the Prime Minister 12 and even when they're in a very powerful position, as 13 Tony Blair was for most parts of his Premiership, you do 14 have to take accounts of the views of your senior 15 colleagues and there was no real appetite within the 16 government, I think with the possible exception -- 17 I mean, I was arguing on this track for some time. 18 John Prescott to some extent was, but it wasn't an issue 19 on which the Prime Minister was feeling huge pressure, 20 and as I said in the statement, there a large number of 21 issues on which he was feeling huge pressure. 22 I think the other thing to bear in mind is that it's 23 not unreasonable for politicians to take account of 24 political factors, like the fact that if he had gone 25 down this road, the Conservative opposition would have 38 1 been perfectly entitled then to use that to get much 2 better sense of support from the press and there was 3 also the whole issue of the -- as many of those books 4 have gone into, the sometimes troubled relationship with 5 Gordon Brown. That would have been a factor too. 6 Q. I wonder if you can throw light, Mr Campbell, on the 7 passage through Parliament of what became the 8 Communications Act of 2003. That's obviously an 9 extremely complicated piece of legislation, but it 10 passed through Parliament at a time when you were still 11 in post, as it were, before your retirement in -- 12 A. Yeah. I don't recall being involved to a huge extent in 13 the detail of policy discussion. And I do remember 14 Tessa Jowell, who I think was the Secretary of State at 15 the time, when she took the job, wanting it to be very, 16 very clear that she was going to be in charge of that 17 process and I do also remember her wanting to be 18 absolutely clear that she wasn't, as it were, inheriting 19 any kind of implied or unimplied deals with anybody in 20 the media empires. So -- and I'm sure Tess will be able 21 to speak for herself, but I do remember that. 22 Q. To be clear about that, she was concerned that as part 23 of the inheritance there might have been some sort of 24 deal, as you say, express or implied. She wanted to be 25 sure that there wasn't such a deal. Did she have 39 1 conversations with you about it or conversations which 2 were in your hearing? 3 A. I think she had conversations both with -- most 4 importantly with Tony Blair, but also I talked to Tessa 5 as well at that time. 6 Q. To be blunt about it, was she concerned to find out 7 whether it deal had been done with Mr Murdoch? 8 A. Yeah, she just wanted to be absolutely sure that she was 9 not, as it were, going into a policy area where 10 a conclusion had already been reached based upon 11 whatever. So -- and Tony Blair was able to give her 12 that assurance. 13 Q. In your hearing? 14 A. Well, I know that he did. 15 Q. One key issue in relation to that act was the decision 16 to remove the restrictions on foreign media ownership. 17 Is that something that you were alive to? 18 A. No. I don't -- I mean, although I was in charge of 19 Tony Blair's media strategy and media relations, I was 20 not -- I didn't see myself as a significant voice within 21 the media policy debate, and I can't remember what else 22 was going on at that time. Lots of things. But I don't 23 remember being too involved in the policy discussions on 24 the Communications Act. 25 Q. When the bill was going through the Lords, it 40 1 encountered some difficulty, and I think David Puttnam, 2 now obviously Lord Puttnam, was at the centre of the 3 opposition to it. Did you have any discussions with him 4 about that? 5 A. I can't remember. I don't think so, but I may have 6 done. I may have done. I can remember -- I mean, what 7 month in 2003 are we talking about, do you know? 8 Q. I think this would have been in early 2003, as it was 9 passing through the Lords. 10 A. Right. 11 Q. It took some considerable time for this Act to become 12 law. 13 A. It's fair to say that after September 11, the year 14 before, I was very, very primarily engaged in foreign 15 policy. I do remember having a conversation with David 16 Puttnam about something else, which was an education 17 policy issue and he may have raised it, but 18 I couldn't -- I can't guarantee that. I was aware of 19 his views, though. I think he was expressing them 20 publicly. 21 Q. Is there anything further that you can help us with the 22 passage of that Act? 23 A. No. 24 Q. In particular, the concessions that were made in the 25 Lords at the end of the day? 41 1 A. No. 2 Q. Go back, please, to paragraphs 51 to 53 of your 3 statement. 4 A. Yeah. 5 Q. We're going back now to Mr Murdoch, still, I suppose, on 6 the theme of implied deals. The three telephone calls 7 just before the start of the Iraq war in March 2003. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. It's not something I think you can give very clear 10 evidence about, save for the facts that they probably 11 occurred or did occur, but the substance of the calls 12 you can't assist us with; is that so? 13 A. Well, I can only give you evidence so far as it relates 14 to what I wrote in my diary. I don't actually remember 15 the calls, but I did write on March 11, 2003 about one 16 of the calls. I don't remember the calls themselves, 17 but I've obviously spoken to Tony Blair about one of 18 them and I've written something in my diary. 19 Q. Which is the "odd, not very clever" comment? 20 A. Yeah. 21 Q. But that doesn't throw very much more light upon it. 22 A. Well, only it does make -- it does appear to suggest 23 that it wasn't, as it were, a call that Tony Blair had 24 made. But whether that helps you or not, I don't know. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let's not use the phrase 42 1 "implied/express deal". Let's use none of those words. 2 Let me just understand what's going on here. The 3 government was more than just contemplating heading for 4 a war. 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It was obviously understandable if 7 they wanted to discover what the reaction from those who 8 are responsible for our media was going to be, and 9 I could equally understand why a Prime Minister might 10 think it of value to seek to get across, in an 11 unvarnished way, unmediated by other press content, what 12 was really going on in his mind, to try and put the best 13 case, which of course is presumably what he was thinking 14 about, for the conclusion that he'd reached. But what 15 I'm interested to know is where that leads. Is it 16 requesting support? Is it neutral as to whether you 17 have support, is it -- I mean, what's going on here? Do 18 you understand my question? 19 A. Yeah. I mean, look. By this point, as you say, it was 20 perfectly clear where this was leading, and equally it 21 was perfectly clear that most of the media were opposed 22 to what we were doing and Mr Murdoch's titles were in 23 favour of what we were doing, and I think it's also fair 24 to say that the Prime Minister -- he would have 25 appreciated that support at that time, because it was 43 1 probably the most difficult decision he ever had to 2 make. It was the most difficult period of the time that 3 I was with him, bar none, but as I say in my statement, 4 in terms -- I wouldn't want to put too much 5 significance -- given all else that he was dealing with 6 at that time, when he was speaking to presidents and 7 prime ministers around the world the whole time, 8 I wouldn't overstate the significance of a couple of 9 phone calls with Rupert Murdoch. 10 So in terms of what I think is going on here -- and 11 as I say, I'm relying on what I've written in my 12 diary -- what I think is going on is that Rupert Murdoch 13 has placed the call and Tony Blair has taken that call 14 and Rupert Murdoch is just wanting to have a chat about 15 what's going on. I go back to the point I made earlier: 16 Rupert Murdoch -- one of the things that makes him 17 different to some of the other media owners, some of 18 whom you saw last week, is that he's a news man. He's 19 interested in what's going on in the world. So I think 20 that's what's going on, but I can't help you beyond that 21 because I don't remember the call. 22 But certainly at that time, it was a very -- he was 23 in a very, very difficult position and we were all -- 24 there was -- in terms of the decisions that were being 25 taken and the policy that was being pursued, it was 44 1 hugely unpopular. We knew that. Most of the rest of 2 the media -- either the papers on the left because they 3 were opposed to the war, the BBC because of the dispute 4 we'd got into with them, the right wing papers, most of 5 them because they hated Tony Blair by then -- it was 6 a pretty difficult media landscape, and whether 7 Rupert Murdoch was kind of just signalling that, you 8 know: "I'm kind of the last one standing", I don't know. 9 So that's all I can really give you is what I've put 10 in my diary on that day. But according to the Cabinet 11 Office, there were only -- between 2002 and 2005, 12 Tony Blair spoke to Rupert Murdoch six times on the 13 telephone. Three of those calls were during this 14 period, and I think it's a combination of Rupert Murdoch 15 trying to find out what's going on and also probably 16 just saying, "You know, we're going to support you on 17 this." 18 Does that help? 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Why would he need to do that? 20 A. Well, he wouldn't, he wouldn't, but I think it's -- and 21 again, I can't really help you beyond what I've put in 22 my statement. But the -- look, it was the biggest issue 23 anywhere in the world at the time. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that, but -- I suppose 25 it goes back to the whole question of the perception of 45 1 the reason why this intensely difficult time which 2 you've described, and which we all remember simply from 3 what we were watching and reading about -- we weren't 4 involved in these decisions, and I can understand he's 5 talking to world leaders about this phenomenally 6 important decision, but that three times he should feel 7 it significant enough to chew the cud, talk, to listen 8 to one newspaper proprietor. It's whether it is 9 appropriate to draw any conclusion about the 10 relationship, because that's, I suppose, what I'm 11 supposed to be thinking about. 12 A. Yeah. I mean, if I -- I suspect that Rupert Murdoch -- 13 as I say in my statement, in terms of when Tony Blair 14 was seeing Rupert Murdoch, it was usually when 15 Rupert Murdoch was in London for a board meeting. 16 I suspect had he been in London around that time -- 17 would he have seen him for a cup of tea or a half-hour 18 chat? He probably would, with all the things going on. 19 I said before he's as very, very significant player in 20 the media landscape, but I don't think it's -- put it 21 this way: I was, if anything, surprised at how few phone 22 calls there had been when the Cabinet Office produced 23 this record. Not that there had been, as you seem to 24 think, so many. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, it's not that it's so many; 46 1 it's just the fact of them against all the other 2 competing demands upon his time. He knew what the view 3 of the Sun was. They'd made it abundantly clear. He 4 didn't have to speak to Mr Murdoch. He could pick up 5 the a copy of the Times -- well, the Sun, actually. 6 A. He could have picked up a paper of any of his newspapers 7 around the world. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, yes. 9 A. I can see why you ask that, but I think it is important 10 as well to remember that -- you see, when you're looking 11 at this now, you're asking me to -- and people may think 12 it's odd that I don't remember something that I've 13 written about, but I just don't. And for me as well, 14 there was so much else going on at that time and -- but 15 it doesn't strike me as that odd, not least because by 16 then I think it's fair to say Tony Blair had very few 17 strong supporters in the media left. So whether one of 18 these calls came from him, two of them, I have no idea, 19 I have no idea. Whether one of them was actually about 20 placing the call, I don't know, I don't know. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: There's a limit to how far we can go 22 with it and I recognise that, but I read into what 23 you're saying to me that I should not read too much into 24 the fact that there were these calls, notwithstanding 25 the pressure upon the Prime Minister's time and all the 47 1 other problems he was facing. 2 A. Yeah, because during -- even at times like this, he 3 would have spoken to all sorts of people and I think 4 it's -- no, I wouldn't read too much into it, to be 5 absolutely frank. 6 And I know that one of your previous witnesses has 7 said that, you know, without Rupert Murdoch's support we 8 couldn't have done the Iraq war. That's complete 9 nonsense. Tony Blair believed in what we were doing and 10 the government supported what was being done and so did 11 Parliament, and that was, way, way more important than 12 any newspaper's support. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. I think that's probably 14 a convenient moment to take just a break for the 15 shorthand writer. 16 (3.15 pm) 17 (The luncheon adjournment) 18 (3.23 pm) 19 MR JAY: I think you want to correct something you said in 20 relation to the five pledges in the Labour Party 21 manifesto -- 22 A. Yeah. I thought it was one of the five pledges but 23 I checked; it's not. 24 Q. The euro? 25 A. Yes. But it was announced before that article. 48 1 Q. Paragraph 53 of your statement. 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. This is the backdoor point. You say: 4 "This tends to be a media presence in Downing Street 5 most of the time, and if there is no particular need or 6 desire to advertise a meeting, it makes sense to avoid 7 the front door." 8 Not very transparent that, some would say. 9 A. I'd accept that, yeah. 10 Q. Then you say, slightly tongue in cheek: 11 "Partly our thinking was that for the rest of the 12 media, Murdoch was uniquely neuralgic." 13 A. No, it's not tongue in cheek; it was what we thought, 14 that if Rupert Murdoch wandered into the building, it 15 started a whole flurry of: "What's he doing there, 16 what's he talking about?" I do make the point that when 17 I left in 2003, whenever I went back afterwards, 18 I tended to go in the same door. It's just a way of 19 avoiding attention, I guess, but I take your point. 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you think there's something about 21 the fact that the government now make their links with 22 senior editors and proprietors much clearer, that you're 23 going to get rather more concern that some proprietors 24 and editors get rather more excess than others and 25 that's not fair? 49 1 A. I would hope that what comes out of all this is not just 2 the greater openness and transparency that you were 3 talking about this morning with Gus O'Donnell but also 4 perhaps a greater distancing between the two sets of 5 people. As I said in my statement, I think there is 6 a real public interest in politics and other walks of 7 life having relationships with the media that allow them 8 to debate, be challenged and so forth, but I think if we 9 could get to a situation where there wasn't this sense 10 of it being relationships that just get mangled. The 11 political, the personal, the commercial. I can see why 12 you might think they're all just kind of interwoven. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's a topic I would certainly 14 welcome your view but we'll let Mr Jay take his own 15 course, and then, if it's not covered, we'll come back 16 to it. 17 A. Yeah. 18 MR JAY: There's one further point about Mr Stelzer I missed 19 out. As a footnote to page 634 of volume 1 of your 20 diaries, you describe him as: 21 "Rupert Murdoch's economic guru, often described as 22 Rupert's representative on earth." 23 The second point, I'm sure, is flippant, but the 24 first point, "Rupert Murdoch's economic guru", you were 25 making a serious point there, weren't you, Mr Campbell? 50 1 A. I promise this is not me sort of passing off but 2 I didn't write all of the footnotes. I think he was an 3 economic adviser. "Guru"? One of those words. But, 4 you know, he was close to him, he was close to him. 5 Still is, I think. 6 Q. When Mr Murdoch was not around and someone was talking 7 to Mr Stelzer, was there a sense that you were talking 8 to Mr Murdoch in some way? 9 A. No, I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't say that. He 10 wasn't, as it were, a spokesman. No, I wouldn't put it 11 like that. 12 Q. Can I ask about Mrs Brooks, who obviously we've seen 13 recently. You say in your statement that you attended, 14 I think, both her weddings. 15 A. No, I attended the reception for the first one and the 16 wedding for the second. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. Just on the first one, I was, as it were, independently 19 friendly with her husband. 20 Q. Would you describe it as a friendship or a relationship 21 borne out of circumstances? 22 A. I think it's difficult, once you're at a certain level 23 in politics -- in fact, again in one of these books, 24 Tony Blair and I have a discussion about this. I think 25 it's difficult to develop friendships with people from 51 1 any walk of life where they might actually feel that 2 they can get something from you, so I think I would -- 3 we were friendly, we were very friendly and I liked 4 Rebekah, but I think "friendship" overstates it. Most 5 of the friends that I have who are journalists are 6 people that I used to work with when I was a journalist. 7 But, you know, I liked her and obviously because of my 8 job and her job, we spoke a lot. 9 Q. Many people have observed and some witnesses have said 10 that she's a consummate networker. Is that something -- 11 A. Yeah, and I think she would see that as part of her job. 12 Q. In the late 1990s, did you assess that her star, as it 13 were, was clearly in the ascendancy and therefore it was 14 important that Mr Blair and the Labour government become 15 close to her? 16 A. No, not particularly. I think she was obviously very 17 bright. You always -- I had a sense very early on that 18 Rupert Murdoch really liked her, and I think within the 19 Rupert Murdoch set-up, then, you know, there's that 20 sense of who's he, as it were, bestowing his favour 21 upon, and I think Rebekah was a rising star. And 22 I think we would have ensured that Tony Blair, as I say 23 in my statement, right across the piece of all the media 24 titles, not just News International, that over time he 25 would see move the key people. I think that's what we 52 1 did. 2 Q. In paragraph 64 of her statement, she referred to her 3 being almost a constant presence in and around 4 Mr Blair's senior cabinet ministers and special 5 advisers. Would you agree with that assessment? 6 A. I mean -- look, even on all of the papers, the Prime 7 Minister and the government are probably the most 8 covered people, including on the tabloids. So in 9 a sense, what I would say is we were a constant part of 10 her life, and indeed of everybody else's life. So 11 I wouldn't overstate that. No, I think that does 12 overstate it. 13 Q. In terms of your mobile phone contact with her, we know 14 Mr Blair didn't have a mobile phone, about how often 15 a week was it? 16 A. That I would speak to Rebekah when she was editor? 17 Q. Yes. 18 A. Some weeks none, some weeks every day. It would really 19 depend what was happening on the news agenda. Average, 20 probably once or twice. 21 Q. If she wanted personal access to either Mr Blair or 22 a senior cabinet minister, did she tend to organise that 23 through you or not? 24 A. Cabinet ministers I can't speak for. In terms of 25 Tony Blair, probably through me or Anji Hunter or Sally 53 1 Morgan or one of the people around the Prime Minister. 2 Q. Did she manipulate the increasingly fractious 3 relationship between Mr Brown and Mr Blair? 4 A. I don't think so, no. In fact, I think she was -- it 5 was a very difficult part of my job, was the fact that 6 the press were writing about the difficulties in that 7 relationship all the time and I was having to go out 8 there as an advocate for the government explaining what 9 we were trying to do and focusing on the important 10 things and so forth. So no, I don't think she did. 11 I think -- I knew that she spoke to Gordon and the 12 people who worked for him and that perhaps they 13 sometimes said things to her that they wouldn't have 14 said to us. 15 Q. Was she increasingly seen as having influence over 16 Mr Murdoch? 17 A. I think -- my sense always was that the most influential 18 person in terms of influence on Rupert Murdoch was 19 Rupert Murdoch. Was she increasingly important within 20 the organisation? Yes. 21 Q. Were ministers afraid of her? 22 A. I don't -- well, if they were, they were -- they 23 shouldn't have been. 24 Q. Yes. Do you think they were? 25 A. I don't think so. I don't think so. Ministers might 54 1 have been -- there were various -- one of the reasons 2 why, even though it's fair to say I think I'm somewhat 3 PNG at News International now, I would -- Rebekah was 4 always very, very straightforward to deal with. There 5 were a number of stories which I dealt with her which 6 were very difficult for individual ministers -- Robin 7 Cook was one, Stephen Byers was another -- where she was 8 always -- we had a sense of I had a job to do, she had 9 a job to do, but we could be straight with each other. 10 Q. Was the Sun ever fed stories by you? 11 A. Yeah. So were other papers. I would say that we were 12 one of the prime sources for every media organisation in 13 the country. 14 Q. So it wasn't a question of prioritising the Sun, you 15 feel? It was just part of your job to -- 16 A. Look, we made a lot of changes in 1997, the biggest of 17 which was putting the briefings on the record, and most 18 of my contact with the media was on the record briefing. 19 I don't think we've -- every single paper thought that 20 we favoured other papers. The Mirror thought we 21 favoured the Sun, the Sun thought we favoured the 22 Mirror, the Guardian thought we favoured the Telegraph, 23 the Telegraph thought we favoured the Times. You 24 couldn't win, really. 25 Q. In terms of the Mirror, Mr Morgan told us, I think, that 55 1 there were at least 60 meetings had he with Mr Blair 2 when Mr Blair was Prime Minister and you were often 3 present at those meetings. Would that be right? 4 A. It might be. I think Piers would also accept that some 5 of those would be receptions and -- what does that work 6 out? Six a year? Is that a lot? Piers was the editor 7 of the one Labour-supporting newspaper. There was an 8 annual lunch that we had at the Labour Party coverage. 9 But certainly, I would be present at most of those 10 meetings, probably. 11 Q. But obviously they were on side, save, of course, in 12 relation to the Iraq war when Mr Morgan in particular 13 was hostile. Was it a question, though, of enabling the 14 Mirror to put the best possible gloss on stories? 15 A. This whole thing about spin, I think, is totally 16 overdone. Journalists aren't stupid and the public 17 aren't stupid and most of the presence of the 18 Prime Minister in people's lives would be what they saw 19 on the television and when they saw him on the news and 20 they saw him in the House of Commons. So most the 21 discussions I would have had with Piers would 22 actually -- certainly during the Iraq war we had 23 a fairly fundamental disagreement. In other situations, 24 he would be and was often angry because he thought that 25 we favoured the Sun, just as I say the Sun sometimes 56 1 thought we favoured the Mirror, but -- you know, he was 2 an editor. I was the Prime Minister's Director of 3 Communications and strategy. It was an up and down but 4 pretty good relationship. 5 Q. In paragraph 46 of your statement, you deal with 6 contacts with other proprietors as well. 7 A. Mm-hm. 8 Q. Interestingly, you recall what Viscount Rothermere did 9 not, the dinner I put to him -- it's the middle of 10 paragraph 46, 00821 -- where his wife complained about 11 the way the Express Newspapers intruded upon their 12 privacy. 13 A. As I say, an irony lost on all but her and her husband. 14 Q. I'm sure this is an example of genuine amnesia on the 15 part of Viscount Rothermere. I'm not suggesting for one 16 moment that he might be misleading us, but anyway, I do 17 mention that. 18 Paragraph 26, please. 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: 26? 20 MR JAY: 26 now. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Are you moving away from proprietors? 22 MR JAY: I'm moving to the more general, but I'm not dealing 23 with proprietors now in particular. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let me just ask a question about 25 them. There's obviously much, much more contact, and 57 1 for understandable reasons, between proprietors and 2 senior editors and very senior government ministers and 3 people such as yourself than there would be for other 4 interest groups. Is there a risk, do you think, that 5 that access can indeed work the other way so that 6 therefore there is a risk which has to be guarded 7 against -- and I'm not saying it can't be guarded 8 against -- that their particular interests -- and that 9 could be commercial, or personal, by which I mean the 10 paper, or it could be that which they are campaigning -- 11 achieves a greater prominence than would be achieved by 12 somebody in a quite different situation who doesn't have 13 the same sort of access? 14 A. Absolutely. I totally accept that. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that a problem? 16 A. Yes. I think it is a problem. I think it means that 17 the interests of one section of the national make-up 18 does have greater access than others who probably should 19 have just as good access to government. So I think that 20 the fact of businesses owning media does give them 21 a disproportionate access. I don't think that's the 22 same thing as power, but I think it does give them 23 disproportionate access. 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, but once you've got 25 disproportionate access, the risk is that the influence 58 1 is that much more potent. 2 A. I agree with that. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Using your experience, both as 4 a journalist and as somebody who's worked in government 5 and the rather higher grade view you've been able to 6 take of life since you ceased, how can that be fixed? 7 A. I think openness is an important thing, and 8 transparency. So when Mr Jay said it's a bit odd that 9 they come through the back door, I think that's right. 10 I think I'm right in saying that, for example, the 11 American President's diary is published, so that you can 12 see what he's doing with his time. But I do think that 13 it has -- it can only be fixed -- I say this when 14 I address the point about the Phillis report in my 15 statement. I think it can only be fixed if both sides 16 of this acknowledge the problem is not just the other 17 side. There is a tendency for those of us on the 18 political side to say, "It's all your fault", and 19 there's an even stronger tendency on this side to say, 20 "It's all your fault." I think unless we can get beyond 21 that, we're not going to get anywhere. 22 So openness and a greater explanation from -- 23 I think the politicians have done a very, very bad job 24 of standing up for themselves in terms of what their 25 legitimate role is, what their legitimate functions are 59 1 and how they have to engage with the media because if 2 they don't, they're going to get blown away. So there's 3 got to be a proper reckoning of each other's power and 4 each other's status, and I think that where we've got to 5 is a position where some elements of the media kind of 6 think they're above politics and they're even 7 (inaudible) phone hacking above the law. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'd articulate it slightly different, 9 or I'd suggest to you that it might be possible to 10 articulate it slightly differently by saying this: if 11 the story's big enough, the rules don't count. 12 A. Anything to get a story. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, it's actually not quite -- 14 A. But a lot of the phone hacking stuff wasn't about big 15 stories at all. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I agree with that, and I'm not 17 actually talking about what might be criminal. I'm 18 talking about a slightly different idea. Possibly by 19 borrowing Mr Morgan's phrase, I'm taking it out of 20 context. Let me start and articulate it again. Let me 21 say this: "We, the press, are not necessarily bound by 22 the same rules that govern other behaviour." 23 A. Mm-hm. And, the extension of that, going back to what 24 we were talking about a moment earlier, the sense that 25 they don't think anything will happen to them as 60 1 a result of going beyond those boundaries because the 2 political class, the police, as we've seen, and other 3 parts of our national life don't treat them in the same 4 way as they treat other organisations and people, and 5 I think that's the bit, when you talk about fixing, that 6 has to be fixed. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let me add one other element to it. 8 I am going to ask you about fixing it, but the other 9 element is that whereas the press will look to hold 10 politicians to account, they'll look to hold health 11 boards, health authorities, educational authorities, the 12 judiciary to account, with rare exceptions, nobody is 13 holding what they are doing to account. 14 A. Correct, correct, correct, and I have addressed that in 15 part when we get on to the -- 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 17 A. -- future. But I think that is the point. They sit in 18 judgment on and expect openness and transparency from 19 every other part of our national life, apart from 20 themselves. And that's, I think, why they're in the 21 mess that they're in. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We have moved on a bit, but before 23 you left the proprietors I wanted to elicit your view, 24 and I've got it. Right. 25 MR JAY: I know you dealt with this first in your statement, 61 1 the concept of newspapers and power, but I was seeking 2 to bring the strands together at the end of this section 3 of your evidence. Paragraph 26, 00809. Paragraph 26 4 contains a general statement of your view. 5 What about the thesis that we've had advanced by 6 Mrs Brooks, Mr Dacre, various others: newspapers simply 7 derive their power from their readers. Do you agree 8 with that or not? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Why not? 11 A. Partly they do. But, for example, some of the smaller 12 circulation papers are amongst the most influential. 13 I think any newspaper can, at a certain point, pick up 14 a campaign and provided they do it in a professional and 15 sophisticated way, they can make that campaign work. So 16 I don't think it's just a question of circulation. 17 And also I think the newspaper editors make huge 18 assumptions about their readers and describe them almost 19 as a homogeneous block. So when Rebekah, for example, 20 talked about: well, they were following their readers in 21 shifting from supporting Labour to supporting the 22 Conservatives, or back then, the other way, the idea 23 that their readers are all sort of sitting there moving 24 in the same direction at the same pace is nonsense. 25 They've made that decision and then, through their 62 1 coverage, they try to lead their readers in the same 2 direction. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think that's in response to 4 a question I asked, Mrs Brooks accepted that there was 5 an element of leadership there. 6 A. Yes. Yes. So -- and they're very good at marketing 7 themselves. For example, the Daily Mail presents itself 8 as the voice of middle England, the Sun presents itself 9 as the voice of the white working class man. The 10 Guardian, the liberal intelligentsia. And that's 11 a perfectly legitimate thing for them to do, but I don't 12 think that's in a sense where what you call their power 13 necessarily comes from. I think it's a useful thing for 14 them to say. I'm not sure it's necessarily right. 15 MR JAY: And a reader, of course, won't necessarily have 16 a view on a particular issue, particularly if it's an 17 issue of some complexity, unless and until the agenda is 18 set and the issues are described. 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. But which time the viewpoint is already being moved in 21 a certain direction by the direction the paper's taken. 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. I'm looking at paragraph 26, Mr Campbell. You say your 24 own assessment, three lines down, is that: 25 "They have more influence on the terms of the debate 63 1 than actual power to dictate policy." 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. The terms of the debate. We're into areas such as the 4 culture of negativity, matters you've outlined 5 elsewhere. 6 A. It's also kind of what's important. A news bulletin 7 running order is a set of decisions that are made by 8 executives. If a -- at the moment, pornography in the 9 Internet, for example. The Daily Mail, very involved in 10 a campaign. Perfectly legitimate. Serious issue. Is 11 that more likely to make the politicians think that they 12 might look at it, try to address it? Yes. Is there 13 anything wrong with that? No. But that's what I mean 14 about the terms of the debate. I don't think they will 15 necessarily decide the policy, but I think in terms of 16 where the debate is, what is deemed to be important. 17 I say elsewhere in my statement, for example, the 18 fact that issues like industrial action are almost 19 always covered from a very narrow single perspective: 20 disruption. The welfare debate is always about 21 "scroungers" as opposed to the people who actually need 22 benefits. That's what I mean about setting the terms of 23 a debate. 24 Q. Although the terms of the debate having been set, the 25 political response which is to dictate policy may flow 64 1 from that, might it not? 2 A. Sorry, what do you mean by that? 3 Q. If the newspapers have set the terms of the debate -- 4 A. Oh yes, sorry, I get the point. 5 Q. -- then the political response, which is the setting of 6 policy, may have been determined by the terms of the 7 debate. Would you agree? 8 A. It might have been but not if the policy-making 9 processes are working properly. In other words, you can 10 get -- I think it's always important to differentiate 11 between a media-driven campaign on something which they 12 say is important, which they say needs addressing, and 13 actually whether in reality it does when all the other 14 issues are there. 15 I think it is important to accept -- and I think 16 this goes for David Cameron, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair -- 17 that the amount of time and emergency that they -- not 18 just the people who work for them, but they, as prime 19 ministers, have to devote and dedicate to kind of 20 dealing with what are ultimately media management 21 issues, it's grown. It's grown and it's grown because 22 of the way that the media's developed, and I think 23 that's a problem to. 24 Q. Then you continue: 25 "They only have power if politicians let them have 65 1 power." 2 A. Yeah. 3 Q. By which, of course, you mean it is within the gift of 4 politicians to prevent the press having power but that 5 might, of course, have obvious ramifications for a free 6 press. But it also presupposes that politicians are not 7 going to yield to the obvious influences and powers 8 which might intrude on their decision-making. Would you 9 agree with that? 10 A. You see, I think a lot of this started under Margaret 11 Thatcher, because I think that newspapers were given 12 a sense of power. The numbers that received the 13 peerages and the knighthoods and the sense that they 14 were almost part of her team. I think it changed under 15 John Major, and then I think when we were in power, 16 I think that we -- I think we maybe did give the media 17 too much of a sense of their own place within the 18 political firmament when we should have challenged it 19 more. 20 Q. You're talking about the conferment of power. One of 21 the reasons why the newspapers have such power is the 22 good reason you've identified, namely the virtues of 23 a free press. We understand that. But the bad 24 reasons -- you list three of those at the end of 25 paragraph 26. You refer to the patronage system. Well, 66 1 the evidence on that you set out. But then the second 2 and the third aspects: 3 "The privileged access governments of both colours 4 allow ..." 5 Which is the point Lord Justice Leveson made five 6 minutes ago, which is the reason why the politicians 7 have let the press have power; is that right? 8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. And the efforts made to win media support. 10 A. Mm. 11 Q. Which is, again, another aspect of the same phenomenon, 12 isn't it? 13 A. Yeah, I think we might disagreed on the word "power", 14 because as I say, I think ultimately the politicians do 15 have the power, but I think all three there are factors 16 within this that have led to a change that is probably 17 unhealthy. 18 Q. Of course, the terms "influence" and "power" are not 19 synonyms. One is weaker than the other, and you prefer 20 "influence" rather than "power", although some would say 21 they're just different points on the same spectrum. 22 Would you agree with that? 23 A. No. I think "power" is a different thing. I don't 24 think newspapers have power. I think politicians have 25 real power but I think that hopefully what comes out of 67 1 this is a resetting of that balance so it becomes much 2 clearer where power does lie. 3 Q. One prefers to use the term "power" in relation to 4 elected politicians because that's what we confer on 5 them. One doesn't like to use that term in relation to 6 unelected organs such as the press, but really it's just 7 a play on words, isn't it? 8 A. No, I don't think so, because if I look back at -- if 9 you look at decisions that David Cameron is making now, 10 whether it was military action in Libya or troops in or 11 out of Afghanistan or spending on the health service or 12 tax levels, newspapers can't do those things. That is 13 really power which he has invested in him because he's 14 the Prime Minister. Newspapers can influence all of 15 those debates. I don't think it is power. 16 Q. Okay. I move to a different topic now -- 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It may be slightly different, but 18 I wonder whether it is not rather more than mere 19 influence -- I don't limit the meaning of the word 20 "influence" -- because what newspapers have is 21 longevity, and politicians tend not to have longevity. 22 So Mr Murdoch has been there or thereabouts for 40 23 years, which is a very, very long time. You make the 24 point that he is the most powerful media owner, and then 25 you describe Mr Dacre as probably the most powerful 68 1 newspaper editor. 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But doesn't that longevity give them 4 rather more than influence? I agree it is not the power 5 to change the law or the way in which this country is 6 run, but it is a very real force, at the very strongest 7 form of influence. Would that be fair? 8 A. Yes, I think in Rupert Murdoch's case it would be, 9 because of the point you make. If you sort of analyse 10 power and influence year by year over the last four 11 decades, and as you say, he's been a big player 12 throughout that time. 13 But, for example, I can remember being struck once, 14 in a discussion with George Bush, Bush asking us what 15 Rupert Murdoch was like because he'd never met him, 16 which I found quite surprising. Whether he's met him 17 since, I don't know, but that was -- and I think when 18 Rupert Murdoch went to the Select Committee and said, 19 "Sometimes I wish these guys would leave me alone", 20 I think that was a little bit disingenuous because as I 21 said, I think he is interested in powerful people. He 22 is interested in the people who make the decisions and 23 make the news, but I don't -- I see it as a different 24 sort of power. I think political power -- and I think 25 the political class has to some extent ceded too much on 69 1 this ground and needs to get it back. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 3 MR JAY: Another aspect of the relationship between the 4 media and politicians, and obviously vice versa, touched 5 on in the Phillis report, which we've looked at it this 6 morning. It's under tab 21 in the bundle we've 7 prepared. Context and evidence section, section 4, 8 Mr Campbell. 9 A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. Background to the breakdown. This is page 7. We were 11 told that three major factors had contributed to the 12 breakdown of the relationship between the government, 13 the media and the public: the communications strategy 14 adopted by the Labour administration on coming into 15 power in 1997, the reaction of the media and the press 16 in particular to that and then the response of the sieve 17 service: 18 "Labour's past experience of handling the media in 19 its belief that government communications staff were not 20 up to the mark saw a rise in the media-handling role of 21 politically appointed, unelected special advisers." 22 You're, of course, at the epicentre of that. 23 "Their more aggressive approach and their increased 24 use of selective briefing of media outlets, in which 25 government information was seen to be being used to 70 1 political advantage led to a reaction from the media 2 that produced a far more adversarial relationship with 3 government." 4 No doubt cause and effect there may be disputatious. 5 It's inevitably mixed up and you would say you certainly 6 can't date this to 1997, you should go earlier in time 7 and your evidence says that, but the basic thesis 8 advanced here is not far wide of the mark, is it? 9 A. No, although the specific -- the same page says the 10 specific trigger for this Inquiry, I think I'm right in 11 saying, was the very difficult relationships between 12 civil servants and special advisers in one department, 13 the Department of Transport, and also then the 14 difficulties we had in relation to what became known 15 as -- because everything has to have a "gate" -- 16 Cheriegate and the Bristol flats. 17 So I think that was the background and then, as the 18 Phillis report sets out, we then got into the 19 difficulties with the BBC over Iraq. So I think the 20 relationship had got into a very, very bad place, 21 there's no doubt about that, and as I say in my 22 statement, I think a lot of the media put the blame on 23 us, I think we put most of the blame on them, and that 24 probably exacerbated the problem. 25 But I do emphasise, as I said earlier, that it's -- 71 1 this will not be fixed unless the media do accept some 2 of their responsibility in relation to how this all 3 developed, and I've set out in both statements why 4 I think it's happened. I think some of it's perfectly 5 understandable, but if we just see this as a problem of 6 government communications, then we're not going to get 7 anywhere. 8 Q. Usually when one is trying to diagnose a problem, it's 9 sometimes not particularly helpful to dwell on fault, 10 and certainly rarely helpful to dwell on personal fault. 11 Are we able to agree that there is responsibility on 12 both sides of the equation, as it were? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. The side of the press and on the side of politicians, in 15 particular those who advise politicians or speak for 16 them, such as you? 17 A. Yeah, I will, but what I won't do is -- you see, what 18 the media like to say is -- you see, what the media like 19 to do is say, "Until you say it's all your fault, we're 20 not going to engage in this debate." That's the way 21 we've been for the last few years. Now, this Inquiry 22 has actually finally led it to a slightly different 23 place. 24 I don't make any apology for the changes we made in 25 opposition because they helped us to win. I don't make 72 1 apologies for the changes we made in government because 2 they helped us to communicate more effectively and 3 I think that helped the Prime Minister to govern more 4 effectively. What do I accept is that at times we 5 probably were too controlling, that at times we did hang 6 on to some of techniques of opposition when we should 7 have dumped them at the door of Number 10, but I'd also 8 ask you to bear in mind just the sheer volume of issues 9 that we were expected to deal with, be on top of. 24/7 10 media means just that. You are dealing with this 24 11 hours a day at a time when, in my case, also trying to 12 be in charge of overall strategy as well. 13 So I think the points that I made earlier about the 14 debit side of the way the media has developed -- I don't 15 resolve from any of them and I think the media has to 16 face up to that. 17 Q. Finally, Mr Marr in his book "My Trade", under the 18 chapter "The dirty art of political journalism", 19 page 161, gives a graphic account of a certain modus 20 operandi: 21 "Tales of how New Labour had bullied junior 22 reporters or producers spread through the warren of 23 press gallery officers in between broadcasters' 24 headquarters. The backlash was slow, but it came. By 25 the end of Blair's first two years, it was a badge of 73 1 honour to be bollocked by Campbell or Mandelson and to 2 shout back just as loudly." 3 A. I don't really buy that, to be honest. Was I robust? 4 Yes. If a newspaper wrote something that I didn't -- 5 that I wanted to rebut and refute, would I do it? Yes. 6 But this bullying thing I think is just nonsense. 7 I really do. 8 Q. He carries on: 9 "The persistent attempts to dictate what should 10 appear on a front page or at the top of a running order 11 became infuriating and hardened journalistic hearts. 12 Even before the 1997 election, it was obvious that 13 Labour had spies tipping it off about the running 14 orders, script lines and the correspondence being used 15 for news programmes and was attempting to ambush them 16 before they went on air to get more favourable coverage. 17 In lobby meetings, Alastair Campbell and others would 18 single out and ridicule the correspondents of 19 editorially hostile newspapers. George James, political 20 editor of the Daily Telegraph and a studiously fair 21 reporter of the old school, was a favourite target." 22 Did that happen? 23 A. You can ask George, but I don't think so, no. 24 Q. Okay. 25 A. And I suspect from the smile on his face, nor does he. 74 1 Q. It may be a different sort of smile. I can't see it. 2 "Favoured reporters were given special treatment, 3 just as their editors were made much of at Downing 4 Street and invited to weekends at Chequers." 5 Did that happen? 6 A. There may have been some that were invited to Chequers. 7 Not many. I'm afraid I don't buy this thesis, no. 8 I really don't. 9 Q. But the political -- 10 A. As I said to you earlier, most of my contact with 11 journalists who defended what I call the 12 institutionalised dishonesty of the old lobby system -- 13 most of my contact with journalists was on the record 14 briefings where they could quote whatever I said and any 15 of them could come to it. Were there some journalists 16 that I liked more than others? Well, you wouldn't be 17 human if you didn't. I think that's just the way of the 18 world. Were there some that I trusted more than others? 19 Certainly. Were there some for whom I had complete and 20 total contempt? Yes, they were. But did I ever kick 21 them out of briefings? No. 22 Q. He continues and concludes: 23 "But the political correspondents have a certain 24 esprit de corps alongside their professional rivalry..." 25 A. That's what I call the "herd mentality" in my statement. 75 1 Q. Yes, that's true. 2 "... and the cynical way in which some were favoured 3 because they worked for Rupert Murdoch while others were 4 sneered at because they worked for Conrad Black 5 disgusted many who worked for neither." 6 A. Well, again, the person that at the Sun with whom 7 I would have had most day-to-day contact was Trevor 8 Kavanagh because he was the political editor and I think 9 it's fair to say Trevor and I disagreed about most 10 things. He was -- I go back to the point I made 11 earlier. Everybody thought that I was favouring 12 somebody else. Everybody thought that anything that 13 appeared in the press somehow came from me. The whole 14 thing was absurd. The absurdity, I think -- I say in 15 the statement that one of the best examples of spin done 16 by journalists is the extent to which the issue of spin 17 became so central to the debate. I had a job to do. My 18 job was to brief the press on behalf of the 19 Prime Minister and to advise the Prime Minister and 20 other ministers, and I did that job in an incredibly 21 exposed place. There were half a dozen -- and I know 22 you have a couple of journalists coming later this week 23 who no doubt will go into them in huge detail. There 24 were half a dozen issues that get thrown back again and 25 again and again and again. I dealt with thousands of 76 1 stories. I dealt with thousands of briefings, and 2 I would defend the accuracy and the honesty of those 3 against any journalist any day of the week. 4 Q. You get a rather different -- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Without exception? 6 A. No, there are some terrific journalists. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no -- 8 A. No, no, we made mistakes, for sure, but I do think, 9 given the pressures we were under, they were 10 extraordinarily few in number. 11 MR JAY: A different perspective from Mr Powell, page 194. 12 A. I did actually read Andrew Marr's book over the weekend 13 because it was on your reading list and there were some 14 places where he was very, very nice about me. I was 15 rather shocked to read that. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's why we've not referred you to 17 them, Mr Campbell. 18 MR JAY: This is Mr Powell speaking: 19 "Alastair was unfairly criticised for politicising 20 the government press service. Actually, what he did was 21 to professionalise and modernise it. When we arrived it 22 was in a parlous state and by the time we left it, it 23 had regained its confidence and become far better at 24 what it did. The seamier side of political press 25 briefing is the domain of ministers' special advisors 77 1 and, of course, of ministers themselves." 2 Would you agree with that? 3 A. That's the point I made earlier, that whenever anything 4 appeared in the press that came from the government, 5 people assumed it was me, but often it wasn't. I would 6 certainly agree that the government communications 7 system that we inherited was not fit for purpose. A lot 8 of change had to be made. Robin Butler, the cabinet 9 secretary, was very, very clear with me that I had the 10 authority to make change. He then set up the Mountfield 11 review, which led to substantial changes. I think 12 they're changes for the better. Most of them are being 13 kept by Gordon Brown and David Cameron and other people 14 got up on all sorts of stuff. There's no doubt about 15 that, and that is part of politics. It's part of life. 16 I tried to control at the centre. I tried to keep 17 a grip of things, but the reality is there are hundreds 18 of people out there the whole time who -- anybody who 19 works in Downing Street in the eyes of a journalist is 20 a senior Downing Street source. Anybody who works in 21 the Home Office is a senior Home Office source. I think 22 we did a pretty good job in having proper coordination 23 at the centre, but it's very difficult to maintain that. 24 Q. Mr Powell points the finger of blame in a particular 25 place. He says: 78 1 "It's the special advisers like the Damian McBrides, 2 Charlie Whelans and Ed Ballses, not departmental 3 spokesmen who specialise in character assassination 4 through the pages of the newspapers. What always 5 surprised me was that the assassins managed to persuade 6 the press to keep quiet about their activities, however 7 many incriminating emails or texts they sent." 8 A. That is a very good point. 9 Q. Is all of that correct? 10 A. No, not all of it, but if you asked me to single out, 11 then I would single out Charlie Whelan and I've always 12 been clear about that and I was always clear with 13 Gordon Brown that I thought it damaged him to have him 14 there. Likewise with Damian McBride. The point I'm 15 make something is that -- I can remember, for example, 16 one briefing where, at the end of yet another frenzy and 17 journalists accusing me of lying and the politicians 18 then getting roped into say I should resign and blah 19 blah blah -- I can remember saying to all the 20 journalists there in the room: "Right, come on, just say 21 what the lie is and then provide any evidence 22 whatsoever." And they never could! 23 So just -- and that in itself is a form of spin. 24 I mean, you sent me Peter Oborne's essay that he did for 25 the British Journalism Review. 79 1 "Most lobby journalists [he said] have been 2 deliberately misled or lied to by Downing Street." 3 Followed by zero evidence whatsoever. 4 "New Labour's culture of deception or manipulation 5 of statistics, secretive smear campaigns ..." 6 Then all this: Mo Mowlam, David Clark, Keith 7 Hellawell, the drug tsar. No evidence whatsoever. And 8 Mo Mowlam is a very good example. Mo came to believe 9 that we were briefing against her because it kept being 10 written, and there's not a single journalist has ever 11 produced a shred of evidence, and that's what I mean by 12 them being spin doctors. 13 Q. Finally, Mr Powell: 14 "They succeeded [this is the special advisers again] 15 in building up a dependency among the political 16 correspondents by feeding them a constant supply of 17 stories so that the journalists were reluctant to 18 endanger that supply by revealing their methods." 19 A. Correct. And that's why if you look at -- there's David 20 Cameron now. He's the Prime Minister. He has his own 21 media team. I don't think George Osborne is necessarily 22 comparable, but take somebody like Boris Johnson. I'm 23 not saying this is going on but if Boris Johnson and the 24 people around him want to be briefing the press in a way 25 to undermine David Cameron, they can do that and they 80 1 know the journalists aren't going to drop them in it 2 because it's too good a story for them. So we had that 3 in relation to the people who worked for Gordon Brown, 4 no doubt. 5 Q. Of course, by the end of your time in Downing Street, 6 Mr Campbell, you were somewhat jaded, it may be fair to 7 say. Mr Blair points out, pages 301 to 302 of his book: 8 "Alastair was getting exhausted and ratty and he was 9 getting set upon by the media, whom he was coming to 10 loathe. He was therefore not handling quite right." 11 I'm not interested a bit in "handling quite right", 12 but you were coming to loathe them, presumably? 13 A. Not all of them. I was coming to loathe -- well, I had 14 come to loathe the culture that I have set out in my 15 statement. There were some individuals that I had come 16 to loathe. I'd come to loathe their self-obsession, 17 their obsession with me, the negativity, the 18 trivialisation. I had come to loathe all that, yeah. 19 But let me just say on the other hand, as I said in 20 my first statement, some of them were and are fantastic 21 first-rate journalists who I think were as worried about 22 the culture as I was, but couldn't actually -- didn't 23 feel empowered to do anything about it. But I was 24 certainly ready to reach the exit door. 25 Q. Lord Mandelson, one of his concluding observations -- 81 1 it's an interview Mr Rawnsley carried out with 2 Lord Mandelson, referred to page 9 of Mr Rawnsley's 3 book: 4 "There was a great emphasis on managing the media at 5 the expense of managing policy. There was a sense that 6 if you'd got the story right, you'd achieved something 7 and that's not how government is." 8 Do you feel that there's any validity in that 9 comment? 10 A. No. I think the policy process was always taken more 11 seriously, but I think we all spent far too much time 12 focused on -- and I speak as the guy who was in charge 13 of this. The politicians spent way too much time 14 worrying about this stuff. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, it chimes with what you said: 16 media issues take up much too much time of the 17 Prime Minister and other senior ministers. 18 A. Yes. But in their defence, it's very difficult when 19 these full-on frenzies are coming at you. There comes a 20 point where the Prime Minister will say, "I need to get 21 out there and deal with this." My point is I think they 22 can have a lot more space. The public are much more 23 savvy about this now and I think the more strategic the 24 politicians are, the better it will be for them. The 25 less they're focused on the day-to-day -- back in the 82 1 beginning, when we started out, I think we had to adopt 2 the approach that we had because we had to recalibrate 3 the playing field, but I think now, hopefully, there's 4 the window, to use your word earlier, to get to a much, 5 much better position, but it's going to require change 6 from both the politicians and from the media. 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You said politicians need to get 8 political power back. 9 A. Yes. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: How? 11 A. Not at the expense of a free press. I think they have 12 to get a sense of their own power back. You made the 13 point earlier about access. They probably do spend too 14 much time -- look, diary secretaries are used to fobbing 15 people off and saying, "No, there's not enough time in 16 the diary." I think the senior politicians need to do 17 more of that with the media. 18 The great thing about the whole sort of change and 19 the Internet and social media and so forth and direct 20 channels of communication now -- just as the public can 21 shape a different media landscape, so can the 22 politicians and they should. But I think there's 23 a sense of them still judging their success or failure 24 far too much on what sort of press they're getting. 25 When I saw, for example, the list of direct contacts 83 1 there's been between this government and the Murdochs 2 since the election -- Michael Gove, for example -- 3 I couldn't believe it. Waste of his time, to my mind. 4 Better things to do. 5 MR JAY: We will look at the future again at the end of your 6 evidence, but I've been asked to put to you a line of 7 questions from various sources, most of them core 8 participants, so I'll do that now, Mr Campbell. 9 A. Am I allowed to guess which they are? 10 Q. I don't think it really matters, Mr Campbell. It's the 11 question, not the messenger, but feel free. 12 Paragraph 7 of your statement, page 00794. In the 13 third line, you refer to taking a more strategic and 14 more proactive approach to communication. Did this 15 entail, on occasion, economising with the truth, more 16 particularly the tensions between Mr Brown and Mr Blair, 17 which you continued to deny as an invention of the 18 press? 19 A. I don't think I ever denied them as an invention of the 20 press but I may have dealt with them in the way that 21 I felt would both benefit the government. You have to 22 remember my job was not -- I wasn't the press' 23 representative in Downing Street. I was the 24 Prime Minister's spokesman. We talked earlier about 25 the -- if you have a roomful of journalists being 84 1 briefed by other people somewhere in the system that 2 there's this problem, then I'd be stupid if I sat there 3 and said there wasn't a problem, but what I would do is 4 say, "Look, we're not going to focus on that, we're 5 going to focus on this. We're going to focus on the 6 budget, we're going to focus on welfare reform, 7 whatever." 8 So it wasn't that I was denying, but I would choose 9 my words very carefully in how I dealt with it. 10 Q. Okay. Paragraph 12 now, page 00797. At the very bottom 11 of the page, you refer to the remarkable shift of 12 opinion made by some of the Murdoch titles on the issue 13 of Scottish nationalism and independence, and in 14 particular the movement of the Scottish Sun. The Times 15 made Mr Salmond man of the year. You're not suggesting 16 some sort of causal connection there, are you, 17 Mr Campbell, or are you? 18 A. Caused between what and what? 19 Q. Between the support the Murdoch papers were beginning to 20 give Mr Salmond, in particular in Scotland, and the 21 Times making Mr Salmond man of the year? 22 A. I think the -- I do think that Rupert Murdoch had 23 decided that Alex Salmond was somebody he wanted to be 24 very, very supportive of, for whatever reason. I think 25 Alex Salmond was one of the men of that year. I'm 85 1 simply making an observation. I do think there's 2 a bigger point in that paragraph. I do think that the 3 Prime Minister, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg and Ed 4 Miliband, they're all getting disproportionately whacked 5 at the moment because of their stance on the media. 6 I do believe that. I think partly the coverage of 7 Cameron at the moment is a revenge for having set this 8 Inquiry up. I do believe that, and I don't think I'm 9 alone in that, and I think that the support for Alex 10 Salmond is potentially related to that. That's what 11 I think. 12 Q. Paragraph 30. Lessons to learn, page 00812. This is 13 a more general question. Do you not think that the 14 government's constant attempts to repackage old 15 announcements -- we're talking now about the Labour 16 government. 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. The government's constant attempts to repackage old 19 announcements, stories and news and put the best 20 complexion on figures create a legitimate thrust in what 21 you were saying? 22 A. I think in -- again, sorry to keep going on about the 23 Treasury, but I think there was a time when there was 24 so-called double-counting, which was, frankly, stupid. 25 This thing about reannouncing is difficult because the 86 1 reality is that -- Andrew Lansley made a speech at the 2 Royal College of Nursing today. I don't know whether he 3 had any major announcements to make or not, but that 4 would have been seen by the people who were there and 5 there was bits on the news, largely of the hostile 6 reaction on it. He, therefore, to my mind is perfectly 7 justified then in going on to another venue at another 8 day and saying the same thing again and hoping to get 9 coverage. Is that reannouncing? I don't know. 10 Communication -- what my definition of "strategic 11 communication" is is the communication of what you're 12 trying to do over time, and retaining the media's 13 interest in that is not easy when what they keep saying 14 is: what's new? When we talked earlier about the whole 15 business about politicians trying to be more strategic, 16 the media want news 24 hours a day because that's the 17 business that they're in and they look to the 18 politicians -- because they're the most high profile 19 people in the country, with the possible exception of 20 footballers -- they look to them to provide that news. 21 Now, all I'm saying is I think the politicians need 22 to step back from that. It's not their job. Their job 23 is to govern. So -- does that answer it? 24 Q. Paragraph 60, Mr Campbell, page 00829, where you deal 25 with special advisers. 87 1 A. Yeah. 2 Q. In your experience, the relationships worked well, you 3 explain. Two lines from the bottom of the page: 4 "I would add that on any sensitive issues, then even 5 special advisers as senior in the system as Jonathan 6 Powell and I would not do anything without general 7 direction and often specific checking from our 8 employer." 9 A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. So you could enlighten us as to what the practice was 11 between 1997 and 2003 and really take that no further? 12 A. I did stay involved with Tony Blair and later with 13 Gordon Brown, but for example, when people talk about 14 blaming their advisers or -- we've talked about some of 15 Gordon's special advisers. I don't think it's enough 16 for a politician to say they're freelance or they're 17 doing their own thing. Jonathan and I were both very, 18 very senior in the system, but if we were dealing with 19 difficult, sensitive issues -- we knew at all times we 20 were representing the Prime Minister, and special 21 advisers are very personal appointments by ministers or, 22 in our case, the Prime Minister, and that's why I think 23 there was a lot of justified scepticism following the 24 evidence of one of your recent witnesses. 25 Q. I've been asked by one core participant to ask you 88 1 questions about the Black Rod incident in 2002, the 2 death of the Queen Mother, which was in April 2002. 3 A. Mm-hm. 4 Q. I've provided with you a little clip, Mr Campbell, of 5 materials which are actually not available. Can we get 6 the chronology right. There was a piece in the Mail on 7 Sunday -- 8 A. No, I think the Spectator was the first piece. 9 Q. Right. 10 A. April 13, Peter Oborne, "How Tony Blair tried to muscle 11 in on the mourning". Totally untrue. 12 Q. Certainly one of the pieces you complained about to the 13 PCC was published in Mail on Sunday on 14 April 2002. 14 Do you recall that? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. We have a proof print of the story: 17 "Downing Street wanted Tony Blair to have a bigger 18 role in the ceremonies that marked the Queen Mother's 19 death, it was revealed last night. A senior Blair aide 20 telephoned Black Rod and asked if the Prime Minister 21 would able to meet the coffin and the Royal Family when 22 they arrived at the Westminster Hall. The PM's private 23 secretary, Clare Sumner, was told by Black Rod that 24 there was no role for Mr Blair and made it clear he was 25 not proposing to change his plan." 89 1 A bit later on: 2 "The disclosure came amid claims that government 3 officials wanted Buckingham Palace to reduce the lying 4 in state from four days to three because they feared 5 there would be insufficient numbers [I paraphrase]." 6 Then, towards the bottom of the page, about ten 7 lines from the bottom: 8 "Black Rod, a former army officer, told her [that's 9 Ms Sumner], politely but firmly, that Mr Blair would not 10 greet the coffin and the Queen and the ceremony seen by 11 hundreds of millions of TV viewers over the world. The 12 plan had already been drawn up." 13 Then on the next page, four lines from the top: 14 "A Downing Street spokesman said last night: 15 "'We contacted Black Rod to go through the 16 logistics. We did not suggest that the Prime Minister's 17 role should be changed in any way, nor did we put 18 pressure on anyone.'" 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. You complained to the editor of the Mail on Sunday on 21 5 April 2002. 22 A. Mm-hm. 23 Q. This was obviously the Monday morning, the following 24 day. You say: 25 "In the Mail on Sunday yesterday, Simon Walters 90 1 repeated the false claim ..." 2 That must be a reference to the earlier claim in the 3 Spectator; is that right? 4 A. Yeah. 5 Q. "... that Downing Street sought to change the Royal 6 Family's arrangements for the lying in state ... to 7 enhance the Prime Minister's role. The Prime Minister 8 has asked me to tell you that unless you print 9 a correction and apology which makes clear unequivocally 10 that this story is untrue and you accept it to be 11 untrue, we will be making a complaint to the Press 12 Complaints Commission under Clause 1 of the Code." 13 A. Mm-hm. 14 Q. I think you made the complaint on 24 April 2002 to the 15 PCC, but there was an intervening letter from Mr Wright 16 on 16 April, where he came out fighting, as it were. 17 The third paragraph: 18 "I do not believe it is in dispute that Clare Sumner 19 telephoned Sir Michael Willcocks to discuss the 20 arrangements ... it is our information that Ms Sumner 21 indicated surprise that Mr Blair would not be meeting 22 the coffin and the Royal Family when they arrived at 23 Westminster Hall. Sir Michael told Ms Sumner that that 24 was indeed the established plan and he was not prepared 25 to change it. In fact, he did make one change." 91 1 Then Mr Wright asked for three questions to be 2 answered. 3 Finally, there was a letter by Black Rod to the PCC, 4 which we see at the back of this file. 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 Q. It's dated 8 May 2002 and came after a request by the 7 PCC made the previous day to respond to your complaint. 8 Black Rod in this letter effectively said that there 9 were conversations with Ms Sumner and the efforts were 10 made to change the plans. Would you agree with that? 11 A. If you look at page 3 of his statement -- there's the 12 indented top paragraph -- he writes the statement that 13 he gave to us that we were then able to use to rebut 14 these totally untrue stories. He says: 15 "In the immediate aftermath of the news of the death 16 of the Queen Mother, I was contacted by the staff at 17 Number 10 to brief them on the PM's role ... I did so 18 and explained the ceremonial. At no stage was I ever 19 asked to change these arrangements." 20 So why on earth he told us one thing, when, as his 21 letter then subsequently shows, he clearly, for whatever 22 reason, had been having these discussions with Simon 23 Walters -- but the point is that it became impossible 24 because the PCC said that they were not in a position 25 where they could adjudicate on fact, and so we just -- 92 1 with all the other things going on, we just said this is 2 a complete waste of time and we dropped it, which of 3 course, then the press took to say means the story was 4 true. The story was untrue then and it's untrue now. 5 I've given -- this was sent to me yesterday. 6 I asked the Cabinet Office to dig out the file on it and 7 I think -- I've sent to your team the copies of the 8 correspondence on it from our perspective so that you do 9 actually have the broader story and how we handled it. 10 Q. What Black Rod says towards the end of page 3: 11 "Finally, we come to the Mail on Sunday articles. 12 Here, I did have contact with a their author, Simon 13 Walters, before publication. He came to see me on 14 11 April to research a story on the costs of the 15 lying-in-state operation. At the end of the interview 16 he made it clear that he had sources which in effect 17 substantiated the underlying thrust of the Spectator's 18 original article. Although I repeated my on-the-record 19 statement, I was surprised by the quality of his 20 information because I could not, in truth, deny the main 21 force of his contentions." 22 A. In which case it's very odd that he denied them on the 23 record prior to that. If you're interested in this, 24 you'd have to talk to Black Rod, because he does appear 25 to be saying different things on the same piece of 93 1 paper. All I know is that a very damaging story was 2 run, first in the Spectator, then the Standard, then the 3 Mail on Sunday and the story was completely and totally 4 untrue. Clare Sumner, whose job in Downing Street was 5 parliamentary liaison, she had to establish what the 6 Prime Minister was meant to do on an event as important 7 as the death of the Queen Mother. And then -- he goes 8 on in his letter to talk about there were these visits 9 from Downing Street. They happened to be the 10 Prime Minister's protection team who advance everywhere 11 that he goes. So forgive me if I don't take this as 12 seriously as the people who wrote it at the time, but 13 the story was total nonsense. 14 Q. Although Black Rod, for better or worse, on the last 15 page says: 16 "I find it rather difficult to fault the Mail on 17 Sunday insofar as its articles dealt with my 18 experiences..." 19 A. Well, he's obviously somebody who was very friendly with 20 the Mail on Sunday and perhaps didn't want to say 21 anything untoward about them. All I know is the story 22 is untrue. 23 Q. Finally, I'm asked to put to you: you didn't reply to 24 Mr Wright's letters of 12 and 17 June. 25 A. I have no idea if I did or I didn't. 94 1 Q. I'd like to think they would have included them had you 2 done so. I think that's as far as I can take that. 3 A. I think Black Rod ended up taking a position on the PCC, 4 but I could be wrong about that. 5 Q. Pardon me? 6 A. I think Black Rod ended up taking a position at the PCC. 7 Q. I think you may be right about that. We can look into 8 that. 9 A. Good to have friends in the press. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Come on, Mr Campbell, don't overdo 11 it. 12 A. Okay. 13 MR JAY: Another question I've been asked -- 14 A. This was in one of the half dozen that I mentioned 15 earlier that always gets raised. 16 MR JAY: The other question I'm asked to put to you is 17 paragraph 71 of your statement. 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. You say: 20 "Nobody with the Prime Minister's or my authority 21 briefed the Sun on the election date in 2001." 22 But if you look at the third volume of your diaries, 23 page 567, entry for Saturday, 31 March 2001, you do 24 refer to a conversation with Trevor Kavanagh in these 25 terms: 95 1 "My chat with Kavanagh had been written up hard as 2 a June election." 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. Then you move on to a different topic: 5 "... and the first call of the day was DB [David 6 Blunkett] saying he was pissed off it came out in the 7 newspaper like that." 8 Or maybe you were still on the same topic, namely 9 the timing of the election? 10 A. I'd have to check against the cutting, but I think that 11 refers to a story about David Blunkett's position in the 12 government. I could be wrong, because I think he was 13 moved after the election. But the point I make in my 14 witness statement is valid. The Sun ran a story -- 15 look, it's obvious. Now we have fixed-term Parliaments 16 so this question may not arise, but the timing of the 17 election is a story that every single political 18 journalist is looking for the whole time and they 19 speculated about it all the time. 20 The truth is we had been planning to have the 21 election on May 3 and it was postponed because of foot 22 and mouth. Trevor Kavanagh had run a story earlier 23 saying May 3, election day official. That didn't come 24 from us and nor did the subsequent story saying that was 25 going to be on whatever date in June it turned out to 96 1 be. I think on reflection, I was probably speaking to 2 Trevor Kavanagh every day at this point because we were 3 in the middle of the run up to the election campaign but 4 at no point did I give anybody -- tell anybody until the 5 Prime Minister announced the election date, although by 6 then we were frankly running out of dates. 7 Q. Some would say that it's fairly clear from that first 8 sentence of the diary entry that you had a conversation 9 with Mr Kavanagh and he certainly gained the impression 10 from it that the election was being put back to June. 11 A. He may well have done, but what I didn't do was brief 12 him on the election date. 13 Q. What's the difference, Mr Campbell? 14 A. Well, the difference is he phones me up and says, 15 "Alastair, can you tell me when the election it?" and 16 I tell him what the date is. Having conversations -- 17 and this is where it's very difficult. I just ask you 18 to imagine what it's like being in my position, where 19 I know the information, he thinks that he knows the 20 information, he's trying to tease it out of me and he 21 reads body language and he reads the way that I say 22 things. I don't want to mislead him. Again, contrary 23 to the sort of Oborne thesis, I never told them lies but 24 I sometimes didn't tell them everything that I knew. He 25 reads the language. By then, it was blindingly obvious 97 1 when the election was going to be, frankly. 2 Q. You say it wasn't going to be May, it wasn't going to 3 be July, because they never are in July, it's going to 4 be June. 5 A. Well, I think they'd all worked that out by then. But 6 it became a source of huge contention because the Mirror 7 then became convinced this we'd given them the election 8 date. No such thing. We didn't. 9 Q. Can we look to the future, Mr Campbell. It's 25 to 5 10 but we have time to do that. You pick it up at 11 paragraph 32 of your statement, 00813. Just some ideas 12 which you throw out. We're not going to cover all of 13 them because we've read your statement. You say in 14 paragraph 34 this is a very difficult area in which to 15 regulate. We understand that. I'm interested in 16 paragraph 36. 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. You're suggesting that there should be greater 19 transparency and the new regulator should be able to 20 investigate the extent to which, really, opinion is 21 being presented as fact, the extent to which they're 22 fair and reasonable in their reporting, and the extent 23 to which they're being sufficiently transparent in the 24 interests which are driving their content. 25 A. Mm-hm. 98 1 Q. How would one go about properly exploring these 2 motivations without seriously impeding the preeminent 3 concern, the freedom of the press? 4 A. I think by being aware of that, there's a possible 5 concern. But if you look at -- we talked earlier about 6 the fact that every other walk of life has some sort of 7 oversight and scrutiny and regulation. Some of the 8 reports that the broadcasting regulator publishes from 9 time to time, I -- would be similar to this. I'm simply 10 suggesting that whichever body replacing the PCC as well 11 as investigating individual complaints against a code -- 12 and as I said in my first statement I think the PCC code 13 itself is a very, very good basis, but also to look at 14 trends. You took evidence from the McCanns. I mean, 15 had there been a regulator who, as that story was 16 developing, could actually have said, "We are going to 17 have an investigation into the way this is being 18 covered", that might have had an effect, and I think it 19 would have been an effect for the good. 20 I mention some of the specific issues there. 21 News International's reporting of editorial line about 22 the BBC. I'm not suggesting you should say you can't 23 have a bias, but I think if an outside body were able to 24 at least analyse whether they felt that there were 25 one -- inevitably there's going to be some sort of 99 1 subjectivity attached to this, but when this Inquiry 2 finally writes its report, judgments are made. That's 3 what people are put in these positions to do. So I'm 4 suggesting some body is put in that position to make 5 judgments so the public can be better informed. And 6 I think actually, as I say later, that as a result of 7 this Inquiry the public have learnt and seen things that 8 they didn't know about, I think that's been to the 9 public good already. But if this body were able to say, 10 "I am concerned about this issue, I'd like to interview 11 an editor or an owner about that", what on earth is 12 wrong with that? I don't see anything wrong it at all. 13 I think it would be a good thing for press. I make the 14 point that some of the -- you would probably know more 15 about this than I do, but some of the regulation of the 16 legal profession I think has probably strengthened the 17 legal profession and it's been a mixture of statutory 18 and non-statutory. 19 Q. (inaudible) be a difference, if you compare the last 20 sentence of paragraph 37 with the last sentence of 21 paragraph 39. 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. Start with the last sentence of 39. You say: 24 "If, for example, a paper repeatedly distorts the 25 facts in support of a political role, whilst there 100 1 should be no means of stopping the paper from reporting 2 in that way, there is value in some respected body 3 pointing out that is what is happening." 4 If the facts are being distorted, that would be a 5 breach of clause 1 of the existing -- 6 A. Well, what I mean -- I don't think I explained that very 7 well. What I mean by that is, for example, I talked 8 earlier about the Sun has a particular view on Europe, 9 or at the moment they have a particular view on Ken 10 Clarke and his fitness to be Secretary of State. So you 11 can take a fact, for example, the Eurozone is in crisis, 12 we'll accept that's a fact, but then you can take that 13 fact and you can turn it into a comment that justifies 14 your position on Europe. Likewise with Ken Clarke. If 15 the Select Committee report is published which is 16 critical of the Justice Department, you can take that 17 and flash it over your front page why Clarke has to go. 18 I'm making the point that the facts will be in the story 19 somewhere. The distortion is in the way they take them 20 to build a comment which relate to a campaign that 21 they're running. 22 I don't think you should stop newspapers from doing 23 that. It's perfectly legitimate for newspapers to have 24 strong positions. The fact is a fact. But I'm simply 25 saying that if you have an outside body that says, 101 1 "Actually this paper has a position on Europe, has 2 a position on a particular politician, has a position on 3 a particular party" -- because Gus O'Donnell, I saw 4 a bit of him this morning and he was making the point 5 about the BBC and Times and this is particularly 6 relevant to this debate about what's being online, 7 I think the public are absorbing all this stuff, not 8 necessarily knowing what the motivation of the owner is, 9 what the motivation of an editor may be, and I think 10 actually an outside body can help to bring the sort of 11 transparency which the media are never begun to shine 12 upon themselves. History would suggest. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is this what some of the NGOs do, is 14 it Full Fact and Media Standards Trust and those sort of 15 bodies, get involved in that sort of thing? 16 A. They do, but it's interesting, I mentioned the Peter 17 Oborne piece in the British Journalism Review, there are 18 some journalists who do this as well, but they tend, as 19 in that article, to be treated as outsiders, oddballs. 20 I think what that Hacked Off and Full Fact and the Media 21 Standards Trust and these bodies are representing is 22 a genuine public concern about what the media has become 23 and this loss of faith and loss of truth in where fact 24 ends and where comment begins. 25 And I think I agree with what Gus O'Donnell said 102 1 this morning, but I think it's naive of either of us to 2 think that you're ever going to change that and actually 3 a part of me says you shouldn't want to change that. 4 Newspapers, particularly in the Internet age, have to be 5 able to take strong positions but I think there should 6 be a greater ability for people and organisations to be 7 able to have a comeback against them when they are 8 distorting, not just fusing fact and comment, but 9 actually are inventing to suit a particular agenda, and 10 we had that the whole time and so do a lot of people in 11 public life. 12 Q. Just trying to think through this, Mr Campbell. One's 13 segregated fact from comments, and fact, of course, is 14 fully within clause 1 of the code, it can be scrutinised 15 now, but there are certainly types of comments which you 16 feel ought to be scrutinised, either because there may 17 be a key to the motivations or political agendas of the 18 proprietors or editors; is that right? 19 A. Mm-hm. 20 Q. Alternatively the comments themselves are so distorted 21 they are close to being perverse and some might say 22 almost factually untrue; is that it? 23 A. Yeah, and this is a difficult area. I talked in my 24 first witness statement about the whole business of 25 anonymous quotes and to my mind the fact that a lot of 103 1 them were invented. How is a regulator ever going to 2 get to the bottom of that? A journalist says somebody 3 said it to me and you can't disprove it, that is true, 4 but most people who's had a very high profile 5 particularly in a political environment know because 6 we've all been on the receiving end of stories we know 7 to be untrue, we've just talked about one of them in 8 relation to Black Rod, where a civil servant was accused 9 of doing something she just never did and then I was 10 accused of having put her up to it and then Tony Blair 11 was accused of putting me up to it to put her up to it, 12 based on anonymous quotes? No. Maybe somebody did say 13 something, but it's very difficult when you know that 14 what they said is untrue. I don't know what a regulator 15 does about that, but I think that having a respected 16 outside body that is able to investigate and look at 17 things thematically, I think, would be a useful addition 18 to this -- to this area. 19 Now, the other area where, of course, you have 20 a problem is that you're looking at the print industry, 21 which is really challenged at the moment for reasons 22 that are obvious, technological change and advance. 23 That's accelerating, but why I think it's still 24 important to keep the focus on the print industry is 25 because these are the same people who, to be fair to 104 1 them, are having to and in some cases are successfully 2 adapting to this technological revolution. So actually 3 if you do get the regulatory framework right for print 4 journalism, I think that will have a profound effect on 5 the way the Internet develops. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not so much as whether -- 7 Mr Lebedev made the point. It's not so much as whether 8 your news comes on dead trees or through the -- 9 A. Tablet. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- tablet or whatever. The fact is 11 that it's about or may be about the thing that 12 journalists do that nobody else does, which is to go out 13 to get stories, to put the facts together and then to 14 write about them in a way that is accessible to a wider 15 population. 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Which is perhaps different from those 18 that are simply tweeting to one another or otherwise 19 communicating on Facebook. 20 A. Yeah, but the -- when we had the little break and I was 21 just sort of having a look at my phone and, I mean, the 22 guys from the BBC and ITV and Sky who are covering this, 23 they're not here. They're outside, they're watching it. 24 Why don't they want to be in here? Because they want to 25 tweet. Because that is now part of journalism as well. 105 1 So they tweet, they write, they blog, they go on 2 television. They are journalists. 3 What I think is happening is that we're going to end 4 up in a position where there has to be a redefinition 5 essentially of what a journalist is. I think it would 6 be absurd to expect you to have regulation for every 7 single person who is on Facebook and Twitter because 8 then you're not far off from saying we have to regulate 9 the content of text messaging and so forth. It's 10 absurd. So I think there has to be a definition of what 11 a journalist is, what a media organisation is, and 12 there, this is where I have some sympathy for the print 13 industry, it's not just about the print industry. 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sure that's right. The problem 15 is, as Lord O'Donnell made clear, that you've not merely 16 got to capture where we are at the moment -- 17 A. Where you're going to be. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- but to devise it in such a way 19 that it is relevant to where we'll be in five years' 20 time. 21 A. Yeah, and I think that is difficult because if you think 22 that ten years ago Facebook, Google, Twitter, YouTube 23 didn't even exist, and now they are dominant within this 24 space and the newspapers are struggling to catch up, as 25 Rupert Murdoch himself said, in their mind, being ripped 106 1 off the whole time for content. That's a difficult -- 2 you've been given the specific area, but I think in 3 terms of this debate it's developing so quickly that -- 4 I've heard you many times and read you in the 5 transcripts talking about the elephant in the room. 6 Maybe for a while the elephant kind of has to the parked 7 a bit, because I still do think if you get the PCC -- 8 the new PCC, whatever that becomes and however it's 9 constituted, if that works better than its predecessors, 10 I do think that will have a big impact on the way that 11 the rest of it, the blogosphere and so forth, develops, 12 because again people aren't stupid. They can work out 13 who knows what they're on about. When you see which of 14 these websites get lots of traffic and which don't, it 15 does tend to be the ones that invest properly in 16 journalism and do real stories and so forth, and 17 hopefully the best get to the top. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, the great problem is that you 19 so define the issue that it is incapable of any sensible 20 resolution, and that's a problem. 21 A. Mm. But I sort of sense that this press who have -- who 22 I sense fear most what you may conclude are hoping that 23 first you and then the politicians sort of say, "This is 24 now so complicated we can't -- it's changing so fast we 25 can't do anything about it." I think if nothing is 107 1 done, given how we've got to where we are now, and the 2 broader cultural issues we've talked about, I think we 3 will be missing probably the only opportunity that we'll 4 have for a generation to get this right. It's -- 5 I totally understand what Gus O'Donnell was saying, but 6 really not the role, I don't think, of legislators, let 7 alone an Inquiry, to say: let's predict how the world is 8 going to be in ten years and legislate for that. They 9 have to take a decision based upon what's happening now. 10 MR JAY: In Lord Hunt's proposals, paragraphs 41 to 43, you 11 make a number of points there. Paragraph 41, 12 I paraphrase: without obvious carrots it's difficult to 13 see what, other than goodwill and good faith, will bring 14 everybody into the sheep pen, as it were. That point 15 obviously is noted and understood. 16 Paragraph 43, third line: 17 "Perfectly possible to have a system of regulation 18 and accountability which carries the authority the 19 government and Parliament can confer but in their 20 operations are independent of government, Parliament and 21 commercial vested interests." 22 And then you've furnished us with analogies from 23 other regulatory spheres. 24 And then you have -- 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: For "authority", what do you say 108 1 about the word "structure"? 2 A. What do you mean by that, sorry? 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: In other words, "... which carries 4 structure the government and Parliament can confer"? 5 A. Yes, yes. But my point is that if it is -- some of 6 these bodies that I mention -- let's take the Legal 7 Services Act leading to the Legal Services Board. 8 I think the fact that it's flown from an Act of 9 Parliament gives it greater authority. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 11 A. And I think the fact that Parliament then can have 12 recall upon its effectiveness is a good thing. I think 13 the fundamental weakness of the PCC has always been the 14 fact that it's a self-regulatory body run by the people 15 who are regulating it -- or who -- so the regulator is 16 regulating those who are being regulated without any 17 real parliamentary oversight of any kind. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. Of course, what Lord Hunt said 19 was that if you even go down that route, there are 20 enough parliamentarians who will really want to screw 21 the press down. 22 A. I know that's his view, and I say in my statement I saw 23 Lord Hunt and he asked me for a chat about it. I know 24 that's his view and it's not my view. I think people 25 are seized enough of how serious the issue is and 109 1 I think -- I'm worried the other way, to be frank. I'm 2 worried that too many of the parliamentarians just want 3 to turn away from this. The ones -- there's plenty who 4 get a high profile of saying what they say on the "let's 5 regulate" side of the fence, but I think my worry as 6 I said, in relation to Michael Gove and some the 7 political leaders, is they just sort of want this to go 8 away. 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 10 MR JAY: And then, Mr Campbell, you identify what you 11 describe as potential flaws in Lord Hunt's proposals. 12 The first of those you have already identified, 13 paragraph 41, the extent to which the papers are under 14 no meaningful obligation to adhere to the system to 15 which they sign up, lack of real detail about how the 16 proposed contacts will work in practice, about sanctions 17 or remedies or accountability, the fear that the 18 industry would in any event manage to water the 19 contracts down once general agreement was reached and 20 followed detailed negotiations, failure on deal with the 21 Desmond problem, and then you finally refer to too many 22 aspects of the new system which are, in your view, 23 common with the old. 24 A. Yeah. 25 Q. Any of these points you wish to develop or amplify? 110 1 A. I think the funding one is difficult because PressBoF -- 2 back to this point about it's their system and they pay 3 for it, but -- so how you would fund this, I think 4 perhaps there does have to be a claim upon the public 5 purse. 6 I think the Editors' Code has always been a major 7 flaw the fact that serving editors are the people who 8 are deciding what the Editors' Code I think is just so 9 obviously a flaw in the old system. 10 I think Lord Hunt is doing a very good job to try 11 and make sense of this, but he's an absolute passionate 12 believer in self-regulation, so he's trying to get the 13 last, last-chance saloon, and I think they have had so 14 many last-chance saloons I think the public would think 15 it were bizarre if we just basically said: well, we've 16 had all this thing, we've had Milly Dowler, we've had 17 the McCanns and all the rest of it; let's just have 18 another PCC but call it something different. 19 Q. I'm asked to put to you this final question, it's on 20 a slightly earlier point: do you think that the existing 21 Editors' Code adequately separates fact from opinion in 22 clause 1? 23 A. Oh, you'd have to remind me what clause 1 says other 24 than its commitment to accuracy. Is it fact, comment 25 and conjecture? Is that the -- does anybody -- 111 1 Q. Comment and conjecture are outside clause 1 in that one 2 can effectively say what you like, but fact is part of 3 accuracy and within clause 1 and within therefore the 4 jurisdiction of the PCC. 5 A. Right. 6 Q. I think that fairly summarises the position. 7 A. Well, I can't claim to -- 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. -- carry the PCC code around in my head. 10 Q. It may be it's too precise a point, which -- 11 A. I think your colleague has it on his screen. 12 Q. Yes: 13 "The press, while free to be partisan, must 14 distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and 15 fact." 16 A. I think that's a very, very good principle. 17 MR JAY: Thank you very much, Mr Campbell. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Campbell, thank you very much. 19 I'm very grateful for your help. Thank you. 20 A. Thank you. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Right. 10 o'clock. 22 (4.56 pm) 23 (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day) 24 25 112